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BEYOND THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE
POWER: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF
AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291
Morton Rosenberg*

Carrying out a campaign promise to eliminate burdensome and
unnecessary government regulations, President Reagan recently
signed Executive Order 12,291 into law.I The Order aims to improve the efficiency and accountability of the informal rulemaking
processes of executive agencies. The heart of the Order is its requirement that "major''2 rules survive cost-benefit analysis. Section 2,
which applies to the extent permitted by law, stipulates that regulatory action may not be undertaken unless, "taking into account affected industries [and] the condition of the national economy," the
potential benefits to society outweigh potential costs, and net benefits
are at a maximum.3
,! Specialist in American Public Law, Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress. B.A. 1957, New York University; LL.B. 1960, Harvard University. - Ed.
The views presented in this Article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the
thinking of the Congressional Research Service.
1. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). The Order applies only to executive agencies, and does not
affect independent agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Justice
Department originally argued that the President could subject independent regulatory com- ·
missions to the Order, but they were exempted on "policy grounds." See C. LUDLAM, UNDERMINING PuBLIC PROTECTIONS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REGULATORY PROGRAM 7
(1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., July 20, 1981, at
1. A more recent memorandum prepared for the Office of Management and Budget, however,
has recommended ''that the White House pressure the independent commissions in a variety
of ways to bring them under the President's control" C. LUDLAM, supra, at 7. See LEGAL
TIMES OF WASH., June 1, 1981, at 1. To date, the Administration has only sought voluntary
compliance with the Order from the independent agencies. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Oct. 5,
1981, at 5.
2. The Order defines a major rule as a regulation likely to result in an annual effect on the
economy exceeding $100 million, a major increase in costs or prices, or a significant effect on
unemployment or other economic indicators. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § l(b), 46 Fed. Reg.
13,193 (1981).
3. Sec. 2. General RetJUirements. In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing
regulations, and developmg legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to
the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the
need for and consequences of proposed government action;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative
involving tlie least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
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To implement its cost-benefit standard, the Order imposes certain mandatory procedural requirements on agencies and creates a
centralized oversight body composed of the President's top advisers.
The Order provides, among other things, that executive agencies
must prepare "Regulatory Impact Analyses" (RIAS) detailing the
potential costs and benefits of all proposed and final "major" rules. 4
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), who,
subject to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, has authority over the definition, implementation, and enforcement of the
Order's provisions, reviews all RIAs and can force the agency to delay publication of proposed or final rules. 5
Although Executive Order 12,291 is the latest in a series of recent
presidential efforts to control informal rulemaking, 6 the nature of the
Order's oversight mechanism, the extent of its required procedures,
and the substantive import of its cost-benefit requirement are unprecedented. In the past, less formalized presidential intervention
into agency decision-making has stirred both court action and congressional hearings.7 If, as published reports indicate, the Order's
stated purposes8 are pursued vigorously,9 it will undoubtedly attract
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggregate
net benefits to society, taltlng into account the condition of the particular industries
affected by the regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the future.
Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
4. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,494-95 (1981).
5. (f)(l) Upon the request of the Director, an agency shall consult with the Director
concerning the review of a preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis or notice of proposed
rulemaltlng under this Order, and shall, subject to Section 8(a)(2) of this Order, refrain
from publishing its preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis or notice of proposed
rulemaltlng until such review is concluded.
(2) Upon receiving notice that the Director intends to submit views with respect to
any final Regulatory Impact Analysis or .final rule, the agency shall, subject to Section
8(a)(2) of this Order, refrain from publishing its .final Regulatory Impact Analysis or final
rule until the agency has responded to the Director's view, and incorporated those views
and the agency's response in the rulemaltlng file.
Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3{f), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
6. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
7. For private challenges to presidential intervention, see, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v.
Costle, Nos. 79-1104, 79-1201, et al., slip op. (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 1981); Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 386-410 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 13 E.R.C. 1586 (D.D.C. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Schultze, 12 E.R.C,
1737 (D.D.C. 1979); Naderv. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C.), qffd, 446 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1972). For congressional hearings provoked by presidential intervention, see Executive Branch

Review ofEnvironmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on Environmental Pollution ofthe Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Regulatory Reform Legislation, Pl. 2: Hearings on S. 262 Before the Suhcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
8. The preamble states the Order's purposes as: "reduc[ing] the burdens of existing and
future regulations, increas[ing] agency accountability for regulatory actions, provid[ing] for
presidential oversight of the regulatory process, 'minimiz(ing] duplication and conflict of regu-
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congressional attention and challenges in court by adversely affected
individuals. Already, critics of the Order have expressed fears that
0MB oversight will serve as a "conduit" for the views of private
industry, 10 and have attacked the Order's cost-benefit requirement as
a thinly disguised ''justification for deregulating business and
industry." 11
This Article addresses the substantial legal problems posed by
Executive Order 12,291. Part I argues that the Order, taken as a
whole or separated into its procedural and substantive components,
violates the constit~tional separation of powers. Drawing on the analytic framework outlined by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure
case, 12 Part I maintains that courts should demand clear congressional support for the Order's requirements. The available evidence,
however, conclusively demonstrates Congress's intent to deny the
President formalized, substantive control over administrative policymaking. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, moreover, the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) repose authority to require additional procedures solely with
the agency, not with the President or his advisers.
Part II addresses the legitimacy of ex parte communications between White House and agency officials, a problem that is exacerbated by the Order's oversight provisions. Because agencies
typically attribute great weight to the views of the President and his
closest advisers, such unrecorded and unreviewable communications
threaten to deprive individuals of due process and to distort the
APA's provisions for judicial review and public participation. Accordingly, Part II argues that significant oral or written communications between the White House and an agency should be disclosed in
the rulemaking docket and that courts should invalidate agency action where this disclosure requirement has not been fulfilled.

I.

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

A. The President's Constitutional Authority
The prestige and aura of tp.e presidential office accompany Execlations and insur[ing) well-reasoned regulations." Exec. Order No. 12,291 Preamble, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (1981).
.
9. Deregulation HQ: An Interview with Mullay L. Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III,
REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1981, at 14-23.
10. See LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., OcL 5, 1981, at5; LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., June 22, 1981,
at 1.
11. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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utive Order 12,291, but it is undisputed that its legitimacy depends
on the scope of the President's constitutional and statutory authority.13 Notwithstanding this fundamental proposition, Executive Order 12,291 does not appear to draw its authority from any specific
constitutional provision or congressional enactment; the Order itself
refers only to "the authority vested in ... [the] President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America." 14 If the legal basis for presidential oversight and management of the rulemaking process lies within the Constitution, it will be found in the
provisions of article II, which have not been extensively tested in the
courts.
Article II of the Constitution reposes all executive power in a single Chief Executive, 15 and charges him to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed." 16 Whether article II authorizes the President
to manage administrative rulemaking through executive orders,
however, is open to question. On its face, article II sets out a potentially formidable scheme for executive control of administration. By
vesting the entire "executive Power'' in the one federal officer with a
national constituency, the framers accommodated the twin notions
of accountability and efficiency. The sparse but important provisions that follow develop lines of authority reflecting the competing
claims of administrative necessity and the separation of powers. The
President can appoint executive officers 17 and require them to report
to him so that he can determine whether the laws are being "faithfully executed." 18 This ability to require reports necessarily implies
the right to confer with those officers. The President in tum must
periodically report to Congress concerning the progress of the administrative operation and may suggest further legislative action.
For some, this scheme implies operational oversight and management of the administrative process, if not some degree of substantive
control, and suggests a line of authority that runs from Congress to
the President rather than from Congress to subordinate executive
officers.
For others, however, these inferences are not so clear. It is well
understood that, notwithstanding their experience under the Articles
of Confederation, the framers did not intend the presidency to be an
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Exec. Order No. 12,291 Preamble, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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institutional competitor to the Congress. Arguably, they did not
conceive of the President as an administrative manager with a general power to control the acts of executive officers. 19 This view also
draws support from the language of article II. The vesting of "executive power'' in the President may locate the situs of power but not
define its content; the "take Care" clause does not say that the President will execute the laws; and the ability to require written reports
from department heads on their activities does not naturally lead to
an inference of power to direct the activities of those who report.
The wording may thus suggest oversight of execution by others
rather than direct execution by the President. The idea that power
over administrative decision-making derives from the President's
role as head of the executive branch or inheres in the concept of
"executive power," moreover, is inconsistent with a written Constitution establishing divided, limited government.
Like the language of the Constitution, the case law provides few
solid conclusions concerning the President's authority to act by executive order in domestic affairs. Although in rare instances the
Supreme Court has relied on one of the President's constitutionally
specified powers to sustain an executive order,20 orders have most
often been upheld by virtue of a specific congressional authorization.21 The Court has not held, however, that the President can validly act by executive order only where a legislative enactment
specifically delegates him the requisite authority. It has instead
19. [I]t was undoubtedly intended that the President should be little more than a political chief; that is to say, one whose function should, in the main, consist in the performance of those political duties which are not subject to judicial control. It is quite clear that
it was intended that he should not, except as to these political matters, be the administrative head of the Government, with general power of directing and controlling the acts of
subordinate Federal administrative agents.
3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1479-80 (2d ed.
1929). See F. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51-54 (1893); Corwin, The
Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 CoLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953); Jaffee,
Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1203, 1238 (1939);
Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. I, 10-11 ("Nor did
[the framers] conceive of the presidency as an institutionalized representation of popular will
distinct from, let alone capable of opposition to, the will expressed by the legislature."); Zamir,
Administrative Control ofAdministrative Action, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 869-70 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
21. See Old Dominion No. 496, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 n.5 (1974); Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 217 (1890); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 888 (1979). On occasion, subsequent legislation has been found to
ratify an earlier order, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91 (1943); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671
(1862), and some cases have even held that continued congressional funding of a program
created by executive order constitutes sufficient ratification, see Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking
& Lumber Co., 331 U.S. lll, ll8-19 (1942); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1941);
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 482-83 (1915).
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skirted the more difficult separation of powers issues, and has said
little regarding the President's unilateral authority to act in domestic
affairs and the strength of the statutory support needed to justify his
action.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,22 better known as the
Steel Seizure case, stands as the exception. To prevent a strike in the
steel industry, President Truman issued an executive order, based
solely on his constitutional powers,23 directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the country's steel mills. The
Supreme Court invalidated the order, holding that the President had
violated the constitutional separation of powers. Writing for the majority, Justice Black articulated a separation of powers theory that
would also doom Executive Order 12,291. Justice Black's theory
rests on a rigid distinction between legislative and executive power.24
According to Justice Black, other than the constitutionally specified
authority to recommend and veto legislation, the President has no
power to make law: The Constitution explicitly vests lawmaking
power in the Congress. Applying Justice Black's compartmentalized
approach, one could argue that executive control of administrative
rulemaking usurps Congress's constitutional lawmaking role. The
Court has recognized the essentially legislative nature of rulemaking,
and has sharply curtailed the President's control over rulemaking
agencies.25 Because rulemaking in e.ffect involves the power to make
law, Justice Black's theory implies that the President may not unilaterally act to control the rulemaking process.
Justice Black's separation of powers analysis, however, has been
22. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
23. During the debate on the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had rejected an amendment that
would have authorized executive seizure, in an emergency situation, of means of production
threatened by labor-management strife. The President twice advised Congress of his action,
but it took no countermeasures.
24. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. . . . The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about
who shall make laws which the President is to execute. . . .
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in
both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of
power and the hopes of freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but
confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand.
343 U.S. at 587-89.
25. See text at notes 62-75 infta. q: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,524 n.l, 542 n.16 (1978) (due process ordinarily
does not require procedures more rigorous than those prescribed by Congress in rulemaking
proceedings); Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (action of State Board of
Equalization analogized to action of legislature).
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widely criticized as ''unduly simplistic" and unworkable. 26 In place
of Black's view of mutually exclusive spheres of legislative and executive power, a more "complex understanding of governmental authority ... [as] shared by reciprocally limiting branches"27 has been
urged. Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in the Steel
Seizure case outlines one such understanding. "Presidential powers," he declared, "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."28 Justice Jackson delineated three types of presidential power.29 He acknowledged that the executive and legislative branches each possess a
realm of autonomous authority. The President, in other words, possesses certain exclusive powers that Congress cannot abrogate or delimit. Congress cannot, one supposes, deprive the President of his
constitutionally specified power to appoint executive officials. Congress likewise possesses certain exclusive powers. In this sphere of
exclusive congressional authority, the President may not legitimately
act unless Congress has validly delegated power to him. Unlike Justice Black, however, Justice Jackson also envisaged a third category
- a "zone of twilight"30 in which the President and Congress have
concurrent authority. In this twilight zone, the President does not
need a congressional delegation of power to justify his actions; he
may legitimately act as long as Congress has not expressly or im26. Bruff,Presidential Power and Administrative Ru/emaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,472 (1979).
27. Id at 487.
28. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
29. l. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be
said (for what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to
an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon
any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential jurisdiction in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
30. 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).

200

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:193

pliedly denied him the power. Congress, however, retains ultimate
control since the President must abide by its expressed will. 31
Justice Jackson's tripartite framework furnishes a provocative
starting point for analysis. To assess the validity of Executive Order
12,291, one must first ask whether the Order falls within the exclusive domain of one branch or whether the President and Congress
possess concurrent authority in the area. It seems obvious that the
President cannot' have exclusive authority to control informal
rulemaking. The Supreme Court has recognized that an agency acts
as a legislative body when it promulgates rules and thus has limited
presidential control over the rulemaking process. 32 Even if the Order is viewed as purely procedural, it would be anomalous to hold
that Congress may mandate the general substantive standards to
which rules must conform but may not establish the procedures that
an agency must use to formulate those rules. At the very least, therefore, Congress possesses concurrent authority to act in the area covered by Executive Order 12,291.
The more troubling question is whether the Order intrudes on an
exclusive province of Congress. If it operates within an area where
Congress's powers are exclusive, an executive order can be sustained
only if an express or impli~d delegation can be discerned. If the
President has concurrent authority, however, an order may be upheld as long as it does not contradict the intent of Congress. Although Justice Jackson did not discuss how to determine whether a
given action by the President falls within the twilight zone of concurrent authority or encroaches upon Congress's exclusive authority,
three factors suggest themselves as especially relevant: 33 (1) the institutional competence of each branch,34 (2) the historic and proper
role of each branch, and (3) the degree to which the executive action
in question intrudes on a function appropriately entrusted to the leg3 l. See note 29 supra; The Yale Paper, Indochina: The Conslilulional Crisis, Par/ I I, 116
16,478, 16,479 (1970) ("Furthermore, the lesson of the steel seizure case itself is
that the legislative will must prevail when there is conflict within the twilight zone.") [hereinafter cited as The Yale Paper].
32. See notes 62-75 iefra and accompanying text.
33. CJ; Bruff, supra note 26, at 488:
At least six questions should be considered in an evaluation of the legitimacy of a
given presidential initiative aimed at influencing agency regulatory policy:
(I) is there express or implied statutory authority for the initiative; (2) does the President have the capacity to execute the initiative; (3) is the initiative best characterized as
procedural or substantive; (4) is the regulatory program suited to presidential intervention of the kind attempted; (5) what protections are accorded to ensure that the rulemaking process remains an open one that is fair to those concerned; and (6) are effective
checks by the other branches of government available.
34. The Yale Paper, supra note 31, at 16,479.
CONG. REC.
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islature. By applying these factors, one can intelligently evaluate the
congressional support that should be required to sustain Executive
Order 12,291.
The first factor, institutional competence, refers to the comparative advantages inherent in the operation of each branch. Because '
the President possesses final authority over his actions, he can make
decisions and take action more quickly than can Congress.35 Congress, by design, acts more slowly as issues are debated, compromises
made, consensus built, and differences between the two houses reconciled.36 Another crucial difference concerns the relative openness
of the two branches to public scrutiny. While legislation is subject to
an on-the-record public debate, only the final outcome of executive
decision-making need be publicly disclosed. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that the President has a constitutionally protected
interest in the confidentiality of communications with his chief advisers.37 These differences suggest that the President is best suited to
act in emergency situations, where speed is at a premium, and in
35. The President can act more quickly than the Congress. The President with the
armed services at his disposal can move with force as well as speed. All executive power
- from the reign of ancient kings to the rule of modem dictators - has the outward
appearance of efficiency.
Legislative power, by contrast, is slower to exercise. There must be delay while the
ponderous machinery of committees, hearings, and debates is put into motion. That takes
time; and while the Congress slowly moves into action, the emergency may take its toll in
wages, consumer goods, war production, the standard of living of the people, and perhaps
even lives. Legislative action may indeed often be cumbersome, time-consuming, and
apparently inefficient.
343 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). In a similar vein, it has been noted that
[t]he special competence of the office of the Presidency is its capacity for fast, efficient, and
decisive action. Power in the executive branch is hierarchical; in Congress it is diffuse.
Decisions in the legislative branch are made according to complex procedural rules in two
separate institutions; in the White House they can be made by one man. The essence of
the legislative process is deliberation and compromise; in the executive process, at least in
theory, it is command.
The Yale Paper, supra note 31, at 16,479.
36. The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose
was not to avoid friction but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.
·
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 55, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Speed and efficiency, however, are not the proper ends of government. If they were,
the framers would have created a dictatorship. The main theme underlying the Constitution is, of course, the desire to temper the decisiveness of a President with the prudence
inherent in a large body which acts through deliberation, compromise, and consensus.
And it is that prudence, coupled with the fact that Congress is closer to the People and
reflects the diversity of their views, that gives rise to its special competence, a unique
legitimacy to commit the resources and will of the nation.
The Yale Paper, supra note 31, at 16,479 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See
Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1976, at 46, 47.
37. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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foreign affairs, where an open decision-making process might damage the national interest or hinder a thorough consideration of the
relevant issues. This understanding of the President's competence
might explain why most Justices, unlike Justice Black, found the
Steel Seizure case difficult. Most of the Justices, perhaps because the
case arguably involved an emergency touching on national security
concerns, were willing to interpret the President's authority expansively. A close reading of the concurring and dissenting opinions
reveals that a majority38 of the Justices thought that President Truman's action was, in Justice Jackson's terms, within the twilight zone
of concurrent authority. Disagreement arose only over whether
Congress had impliedly denied the President authority to act.
Executive Order 12,291 stands in sharp contrast to President Truman's decision to seize the steel mills. Few would seriously contend
that agency rulemaking has created a crisis situation necessitating a
swift response or has somehow jeopardized the nation's security.
The special competence of the office of the presidency is thus not
needed to correct deficiencies in the rulemaking process. Public debate and legislative compromise are possible and, because the Order
al~ers the way that fundamental domestic policies are formulated,
desirable.
The desirability of legislative rather than presidential action
points to the second factor affecting the categorization of the Order:
the historic and proper role of each branch of government. The
Constitution, of course, does not speak directly to the control of the
federal bureaucracy. The proper role of the President must, therefore, be implied from his constitutional authority to appoint executive officers and to require reports from his subordinates, and from
his duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."39 Consideration of the express and implied powers accorded the President
by article II, however, should not end the inquiry. The Constitution's general grant of legislative power to Congress40 further delimits the President's authority to regulate domestic affairs. According
to the prevailing view, the framers intended the constitutional role of
the Chief Executive, at least in domestic affairs, to be ancillary to
that of the legislature.41 They believed that the President would be a
38. See 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); 343 U.S. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring);
343 U.S. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring); 343 U.S. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., Minton, J. & Reed, J.,
dissenting).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
41. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161, 181 (1978).
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managerial agent for the legislature rather than an independent
source of domestic policy.42 This view is evinced by a number of
contemporaneous sources. Statutes enacted by the earliest Congresses, for example, reveal an assumption that Congress, not the
President, should direct the operation of domestic agencies, and that
presidential control over the execution of domestic laws was purely a
matter of legislative authorization. In establishing the Departments
of Foreign Affairs, 43 War,44 and the Navy,45 Congress recognized
that the President should have full control over those officers who
would perform the highly sensitive and political functions that the
Constitution explicitly vests in the Chief Executive - such as the
conduct of foreign affairs and the command of the military. The
statutes creating those departments explicitly empowered the President to direct and control their activities. Provision for presidential
direction, however, was conspicuously absent in the statutes creating
domestic departments such as the Treasury,46 the Post Office,47 and
the Interior Department.48 The Treasury Department statute, for example, did not even mention the President; it required the Secretary
to report to Congress "and generally perform all such services relative to the finances, as he shall be directed to perform."49 Such direction, the context makes clear, was to come from Congress, not the
President. Indeed, for a significant period in our early history, the
President did not see departmental budget estimates before the
Treasury Department transferred them to Congress, and the Secretary recommended tax policy directly to Congress. 50 Similarly, the
Postmaster General was given detailed discretionary duties with no
suggestion that he was to be under other than congressional direction
in performing these tasks. 51
42. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
43. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, l Stat. 28.
44. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, l Stat. 49.
45. Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, § 1, l Stat. 553.
46. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66.
47. Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3, l Stat. 357.
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 1, 9 Stat. 395.
49. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, l Stat. 65, 66.
50. L WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 78 {1954); L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 326 {1948).
51. W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 19, at 1480. Professor Goodnow remarked about this
unusual administrative organization as follows:
In the United States, the original conception of the head of department was that of an
officer stationed at the center of the government who might have, it is true, in many cases
the power of appointment and removal, but who was not supposed to direct the actions of
the subordinates of his department. • . . The conception of a hierarchy of subordinate
and superior officers was very dim if it existed at all.
F. GOODNOW, supra note 19, at 136-37.
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The opinions of Attorneys General throughout the nineteenth
century echo the view that the "take Care" clause does not authorize
the President to control subordinate officials in the exercise of their
statutory discretion. For example, when pensioners tried to appeal
the Comptroller's decision regarding the level of veterans' pensions
directly to the President, Attorney General Wirt advised that the
Comptroller's statutory authority was exclusive:
If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a
duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it; but no other officer
can perform it without a violation of the law; and were the President to
perform it, he would not only be taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be violating them himself. 52

In the same vein, Attorney General Mason concluded in 1846 that
the President's power to ensure that his subordinates "faithfully" execute their statutory duties does not confer on him "the power of
cqrrecting, by his own official action, the errors of judgment of incompetent or unfaithful subordinates."53 Other Attorneys General
applied this rule to a wide variety of situations where a subordinate
was directly vested with authority by Congress,54 so that, by 1884,
Attorney General Brewster could inform the President of a "well settled" general rule: "It has repeatedly been held that the observance
of your constitutional duty of taking care that the laws be faithfully
executed does not of itself warrant your taking part in the discharge
of duties devolved by law upon an executive officer."55
52. l Op. Atty. Gen. 624, 625-26 (1823).
The Constitution of the United States requires that the laws be faithfully executed;
that is, it places the officers engaged in the execution of the laws under his general superintendence; . . . But it never could have been the intention of the Constitution, in assigning this general power to the President . . . that he should in person execute the laws
himself. . . . The Constitution assigns to Congress the power of designating the duties of
particular officers: the President is only required to take care that they execute them faithfully. . . . He is not to perform the duty, but to see that the officer assigned by Jaw
performs his dutyfaithfully - that is, honestly: not with perfect correctness of judgment,
but honestly.
Id. at 625-26 (emphasis in original).
53. 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 515, 516 (1846).
54. For example, the President was told that he could not interfere with a patent decision,
13 Op. Atty. Gen. 28 (1869), and that he had no authority to review a department head's
decision concerning the lowest bidder on a contract, 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 226 (1853).
55. 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 31, 33 (1884). See l Op. Atty. Gen. 624 (1823); I Op. Atty. Gen. 705
(1825); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 480, 481 (1831); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 507, 508 (1832) (Comptroller's
decision "is conclusive upon the executive branch of government"); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 544
(1832); 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 630, 635 (1852) (presidential interference "would be a usurpation on
the part of the President, which the accounting officers would not be bound to respect" unless
Congress expressly ordered them to do so); 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 14 (1864); 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 28
(1869); 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 94, 101-02 (1876). The opinions are not unanimous, however. See 7
Op. Atty. Gen. 453, 469-70 (1855). In Attorney General Cushing's view, a denial of the power
of presidential direction would allow Congress to "so divide and transfer the executive power
as utterly to subvert Government." The opinion was called "extreme" by a prominent early
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The original view of the limited nature of presidential control
over the discretionary actions of subordinate officers is confirmed by
contemporaneous judicial precedent as well. In Kendall v. United
States, 56 for example, a statute directed the Postmaster General to
pay a group of individuals who had delivered the mail for a number
of years an amount determined by the Solicitor. The Postmaster
General, apparently at the express direction of the President, refused
to pay the full amount that the Solicitor had found owing. The
Supreme Court, viewing the Postmaster General's duty to pay the
full amount as ministerial rather than discretionary, held that the
President had no authority to direct the Postmaster General's performance of his statutory duty. Despite the Kendall Court's narrow
holding, key passages in the opinion reflect the nineteenth-century
notion that the President may not direct the manner in which executive officers carry out their discretionary functions. Where Congress
has imposed upon an executive officer a valid duty, the Kendall
Court declared, "the duty and responsibility grow out of and are
subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President."57 Underlying the Court's rejection of the contention that the
"take Care" clause carries with it the power to control executive officials was a strong desire to avoid "clothing the President with the
power entirely to control the legislation of Congress." 58 Other early
cases, like Kendall, also reflect the primacy of Congress in domestic
affairs.59 Congressional enactments, legal opinions of the various Attorneys General, and early judicial precedent thus establish that the
President's role in the scheme of government established by the Constitution for more than a century of our nation's existence was that of
a managerial agent for the legislature.60 This prevailing view was
premised on the assumption that presidential power was not essencommentator. F. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 81 (1905).
56. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
57. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610.
58. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
59. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,516 (1911) (holding Secretary of Agriculture to be an agent ofCongess in promulgating "administrative" rules); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (holding that where Congress vests the power of appointment in
some official other than the President, it can regulate and restrict the manner of removing that
appointee); Ex Parle Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney,
C.J.) ("The only power .•. which the President possesses, where the 'life, liberty or property'
of a private citizen are concerned, is the power and duty . . . 'that he shall take care that the
laws shall be faithfully executed.' He is not authorized to execute them himself, or through
agents or officers, civil or military, appointed by himself, but he is to take care that they be
faithfully carried into execution."). The continuing validity of Perkins was affirmed in Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926).
60. As late as 1885, Woodrow Wilson could suggest in his Congressional Government that
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tially constitutionally based, but emanated from the legislative will,
an assumption that traced its roots to the reasons for founding the
Republic. 61 This view, moreover, carries with it the concomitant notion that presidential e.fforts to control the administrative actions of
subordinate officers must find their bases in explicit constitutional
provisions, express statutory enactments, or the clearest of implications from a congressional mandate or course of practice. The lack
of congressional prohibition is, undei: this view, insufficient in itself
to support executive power to control administrative discretion, even
indirectly.
While the President's authority directly to control his subordinates' performance of specific statutory duties occupied the attention
of legal scholars and the courts in the nineteenth century, twentiethcentury judicial precedents address a more indirect means of influence: the President's power to remove subordinate officials. Myers v.
United States, 62 the leading case, held unconstitutional a statute providing that postmasters appointed by the President with the Senate's
consent shall hold office for four years unless "removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."63 The President's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," the Court reasoned, demands that he have unqualified
authority to remove as well as to appoint subordinate officials. 64
Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion has been read as discerning
broad supervisory power vested in the President by article II: The
President, he concluded, must have the authority to "supervise and
guide" at least some decisions of subordinate officers "to secure that
unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II . . . evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone." 65
Although the Justice Department's legal memorandum accompanying Executive Order 12,291 relies heavily on the interpretation
given the "take Care" clause by Chief Justice Taft in Myers, 66 such
the presidency was at best a ceremonial and symbolic office in need of executive and administrative suppport from a reorganized Congress. See Zamir, supra note 19, at 871-73.
61. See Karl, supra note 19, at 11.
62. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
63. 272 U.S. at 107 (quoting Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 80, 81).
64. 272 U.S. at 117.
65. 272 U.S. at 135.
66. Memorandum of Acting Assistant Attorney General Larry L. Simms, Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation," February 13, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Simms
Memo] (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
\
More specifically, the Justice Department memorandum reasons as follows. It' first sets
forth the general constitutional principles perceived as underlying presidential authority. The
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reliance is misplaced. The indirect power of removal differs significantly from the Order's conception-to-enactment influence over administrative rulemaking, and the Court's opinion nowhere goes so
far as to hold that the President may direct the outcome of all decisions specifically committed by statute to a subordinate. The Court
carefully distinguished the "ordinary duties of officers prescribed by
statute" from those duties "so peculiarly and specifically committed
to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether
the President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his
statutory duty in a particular instance."67 Because the former duties
"come under the general administrative control of the President," he
may properly "supervise and guide" their performance.68 But Taft's
opinion makes clear that the Chief Executive's power to "supervise
and guide" his subordinates in the conduct of "ordinary duties" 69
prescribed by statute does not extend to the rulemaking and adjudicatory functions committed by law to his subordinates' discretion.
The President may remove a subordinate for negligent or inefficient
use of that discretion; he may not, however, exercise his removal
power before the subordinate has exercised the personally committed discretion. 70
"take Care" clause, as construed in Myers, is asserted to authorize the President, as head of the
Executive Branch, to "supervise and guide" executive officers in carrying out the statutes
under which they act so that there can be some measure of uniformity in the interpretation and
execution of diverse laws enacted by Congress. A denial of such guidance from the sole officer
vested with the executive power under the Constitution could result in confusion and inconsistency among government agencies. On the other hand, it is conceded that Congress may so
delimit a delegation of authority to a subordinate official as to preclude presidential supervision of decision-making. Such cases are rare, it is argued, and it must be presumed that when
Congress delegates rulemaking authority to the heads of nonindependent agencies, it is aware
that they are removable at the will of the President. It would thus be anomalous to believe that
Congress would make such delegations with a lack of understanding of the existence of that
control relationship. From these premises it is concluded that the standard to be applied for
determining the permissible extent of presidential guidance and supervision is to be based on
the degree of displacement of subordinate officer discretion. "[S]upervision is more readily
justified when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion
which Congress has allocated to a particular subordinate official. A wholesale displacement
might be held inconsistent with the statute vesting authority in the relevant official." Id at 4.
67. 272 U.S. at 135.
68. 272 U.S. at 135.
69. The structure of this critical paragraph supports an argument that by "ordinary duties"
Taft meant ministerial tasks or purely administrative duties not involving substantive decisionmaking since that passage is immediately followed by passages that clearly set apart rulemaking and adjudicatory functions. If so, the power to "supervise and guide" is of minimal
substance.
70. Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or
revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there
may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President cannot in a particular case properly influence or control.
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This requirement is not an empty procedural nicety. Although
the President may remove an officer for a particularly offensive decision, he obviously cannot use the removal power to exert control
over all administrative rulemaking. The threat of removal, of
course, gives the President great influence, but the decision that
prompted the removal remains unaltered, and perhaps unalterable,71
until a new appointee reverses the offensive action. 72 After-the-fact
removal, moreover, gives Congress notice of the dispute and an opportunity to clarify its intent on the matter or to refuse to confirm a
new nominee to an advice and consent position. Limiting the President to after-the-fact removal thus partially prevents secret or undue
Executive influence in an area committed to a particular
subordinate's discretion.
Reliance on Myers is misplaced for a second reason as well:
More recent cases have greatly limited the removal power that the
Court once recognized. Distinguishing between purely executive officials such as the postmaster in Myers and officials who, while titularly within the executive branch, perform quasi-judicial or quasilegislative functions, the Court has held that the President may not
remove the latter type of official without cause. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 13 the President had removed a member of the
Federal Trade Commission without cause despite a statutory provision that precluded removal except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office." In rejecting the idea of an illimitable presidential removal power, the Court emphasized the distinction between officials who performed purely executive tasks and those who
carried out rulemaking and adjudication. "[A]n administrative body
created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies," the
Court declared, "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an
arm or eye of the executive."74
The most recent removal case, Wiener v. United States, 15 reiterBut even in such a case he may consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for
removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer
by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised.
272 U.S. at 135.
71. Due process, for example, may prevent the withdrawal of a property right granted.
72. The difficulties that may be encountered, and the occasional inefficacy of the use of the
removal power to alter the course of discretionary decision-making, was dramatized in the
aftermath of the Saturday Night Massacre. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C,
1973) (holding that Acting Attorney General Bork had illegally dismissed the Watergate
prosecutor).
73. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
74. 295 U.S. at 628.
75. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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ated the Humphrey's Court's distinction between purely executive
and other types of administrative officials. The Wiener Court held
that the President lacked the authority to remove a member of the
War Claims Commission even though the Commission's founding
statute had no removal provision. Because the official performed adjudicative tasks more closely allied to the judicial than the executive
power, the Court reasoned that Congress intended to deny the President the power of removal. Humphrey's and Wiener thus teach that
the scope of presidential authority depends on the agency function
that the President seeks to control.76 Where that function is legislative or judicial in nature, authority for presidential control cannot be
implied from the Constitution.
Although one must resist simplistic distinctions between executive, judicial, and legislative functions, there is a strong connection
between legislative power and informal rulemaking. Rulemaking
power is, of course, a preeminent feature of the modern administrative agency, and the promulgation of rules has been a normal feature
of American government since its inception. It is only during the
present century, however, that rulemaking authority has brought
about a shift in the center of gravity of lawmaking. Due to the increasing complexity of modern society, Congress now lacks the capacity to enact all of the legislation that it regards as desirable. The
number and size of the problems requiring regulatory attention, together with the constraints on congressional decision-making, increasingly demand that legislative tasks be delegated to
administrative agencies. It was originally thought that the agencies
would merely work out the technical details of broad policies established by Congress. Yet today, administrative legislation dwarfs the
primary legislation of Congress, and the vastness of the delegations
now required have blurred the line between principle and detail. 77
The legislative mandate of the agencies is often a skeleton; consequently, they must author the broad regulatory policies characteristic
of statutory law. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court has
76. At least one commentator has raised the question whether the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), ''that Congress may authorize the Attorney
General to establish limitations on the President's power, ••• implicitly ..• overrule[s Wiener]." Mishkin, Great Cases and Sofl Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA
L. REV. 76, 82-83 (1974). Mishkin doubts, however, that this part of the Nixon opinion is
reliable. Id.
77. The courts have upheld delegations that contain no or exceedingly general standards to
guide the agency. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) {upholding a delegation
without a substantive standard); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (delegation
authorized FCC to license radio communications "as the public convenience, interest or necessity requires."). See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
52-80 (7th ed. 1979). For a criticism of the delegation doctrine, see note 84 i'!fra.
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treated rulemaking as a legislative process for purposes of both the
President's removal power and due process. 78 In view of the essentially legislative character of administrative rules, 79 strong reasons
exist for minimizing presidential control over agency rulemaking.
To the extent that the President can control rulemaking, he has the
unilateral ability to enact fundamental domestic policy, 80 a power
that the Constitution entrusts to the legislature. Presidential direction of rulemaking thus undermines the values that the framers
sought to protect by resting lawmaking power in Congress. First,
placing lawmaking authority in the President's hands deprives lawmaking of much of its participatory character. Congress can act only
after legislation has been publicly proposed and debated. During
the often lengthy period of consideration, interested groups can and
do voice their views. In contrast, the presidential decision-making
process, by institutional design, is often hidden from the public's
view, and the sense of participation is correspondingly diminished. 81
Second, presidential control, in effect, makes it considerably easier to enact or repeal legislation. Due to the slowness and political
fragmentation of the legislature, the framers expected that regulatory
policies could be implemented only with great difficulty. Conferring
legislative powers on the President frustrates the framers' expectation. Unrestrained by the procedural complications and political vicissitudes of the legislature, the President can rather easily
implement regulatory policy through executive order. The difficulties accompanying congressional action facilitate this type of legislative action: Congress can prevent the implementation of the
78. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 n.l, 542 n.16 (1978); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944);
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
79. Properly promulgated rules and regulations have the same legal effect as statutes.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979). Their provisions have the force oflaw and
they are backed by the same sanctions as statutes, including, in many instances, the criminal
sanctions designed to coerce obedience to the law.
80. Undeniably, the President's executive responsibilities also involve lawmaking of sorts.
In interpreting the particular terms of a statute which he must enforce, the President must
exercise judgment that "shades" into lawmaking. Cf. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("the inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation
means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts"); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973) ("Statutory interpretation shades into
judicial lawmaking on a spectrum."). The interpretative skills that the President must exercise
in enforcing the law, however, fundamentally differ from the broad policy judgments that the
FCC, for example, must make when formulating broadcasting regulations "in the public
interest."
81. Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem ofPresidential Legislation, 40 LA w
& CoNTEMP. PROB. l, 38 (1976) (''when a President acts through an order, he avoids having to
subject his policy to public scrutiny and debate").
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President's domestic policies only by enacting a statute to block the
action. And the President can render his action even more secure by
using his veto power. Ironically, a two-thirds majority vote is
needed to overturn rather than undertake such legislative action. 82
As a result, the continuity of domestic policy that the framers must
have desired is disturbed. Using his power to control rulemaking,
each successive President could discard disagreeable policies or implement new ones. Perhaps more importantly, the ease of legislative
action through presidential control of rulemaking would thwart the
framers' desire to limit governmental power.
Third, there is no assurance that policies enacted via executive
order will be accompanied by a sufficiently broad popular consensus.
It is a matter of political reality that an elected candidate does not
represent the views of his constituency on every issue. Voters often
elect a candidate because they support his position on issues that
they consider fundamental, and they may disagree with many of his
other stances. If permitted to legislate by executive order, the President can enact his less popular policies with a simple stroke of his
pen. In contrast, a congressman encounters greater difficulty because, unlike the President, he must persuade a majority of Congress
to accept his views. There is thus a much greater guarantee that legislation passed by Congress has the wide popular support that the
framers desired. Ironically, presidential control of the substantive
products of the administrative process, a measure sometimes urged
to improve the accountability of the administrative process, 83 actu82. One commentator has observed that congressional control of presidential policymaking is likely to be ineffectual for two reasons:
First, Co!}g_ress cannot simply "overrule the executive" when it objects to the executive's interpretation of a statute. Overrule can generally be-accomplished only by means
of repeal or amendment of the statute in question, and this is subject to a (likely) presidential veto; thus a super-majority of two-thirds of each house would be needed to rein in
expansive executive policy-making. In fact, shortly after President Ford imposed the oil
import fees, Congress did pass a bill suspending the fees, but the President vetoed it.
Second, when Congress is faced with an executive policy that is in place and functioning, Congress often acquiesces in the executive's action for reasons which have nothing to
do with the majority's preferences on the policy issues involved. In such a situation, Congress may not want to embarrass the President; or Congress may want to score political
points by attacking the executive's action rather than accepting political responsibility for
some action itself; or Congresspersons may be busy running for reelection or tending to
constituents' individual problems; or Congress may be lazy and prefer another recess; or
there may just be inertia because some policy is functioning. For these reasons and
others, congressional review of executive policy-making is sporadic, and the executive
frequently makes policy without Congress either taking responsibility for it or repudiating
it. The result is a system sharply skewed towards executive policy-making.
Gewirtz, supra note 36, at 78-79.
83. See Bruff, supra note 26, at 453-63; Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
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ally reduces the voters' control over domestic policy. 84 History, precedent, and policy all favor viewing rulemaking as an exclusive
legislative function properly controlled by Congress.
The third factor influencing whether a given presidential action
falls within the twilight zone of concurrent authority or encroaches
upon Congress's exclusive au~ority is the extent to which the President's action intrudes on a function properly reserved for the legislature. Although rulemaking, as we have seen, is essentially a
legislative function, presidential action in this sphere is not necessarily objectionable. Presidential directives improving intra-agency
communication or access to relevant scientific information, for example, do not seriously interfere with the legislative character of
rulemaking. Such measures, best described as "facilitative,"85 do not
command an agency to take certain action and do not affect an
agency's substantive orientation; they simply allow an agency to execute better whatever it perceives to be its mandate. Procedural requirements pose more difficult questions because they may or may
not affect the substance of agency rules. Where particular procedu84. "[Presidential legislation] provides policy quickly and decisively. [But by] evading
Congress, . . . it sacrifices accountability and consent. In short, it replaces government by law
with rule by orders." Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 81, at 40. See Scher, Condi/Ions for
Legislative Control, 25 J. PoL. 526 (1963) ("Democratic ideology requires control of administrative action by elected representatives of the people."). One cannot deny the validity of the
concerns expressed by advocates of increased presidential supervision of agency policymaking. Administrative policy-making is now largely unaccountable to either Congress or the
President. Due to the broad delegations of lawmaking power upheld by the courts and the
sporadic quality of congressional oversight, see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 847-48 (2d ed. 1980), Congress has failed to perform its constitutionally assigned task of legislating basic policy. Presidential control over agency rulemaking,
however, is an improper response to a very real problem. Presidential policy-making control
distorts rather than ensures adherence to constitutional values. A better response to the accountability problem is to revive the delegation doctrine so that delegations of lawmaking
power will be accompanied by meaningful standards. By requiring Congress to make basic
policy decisions, a stricter delegation doctrine achieves accountability but not at the expense of
transferring enormous amounts of legislative power to the President. This approach draws
support from Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). In that
case, a majority of the Court intimated that it would be willing to employ the delegation doctrine to invalidate "'sweeping delegation[s] of legislative power'. . . ." 448 U.S. at 646 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); 448 U.S. at 674-76, 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Commentators have also called for a revivification of the delegation doctrine. See, e.g.,
Wright, Beyond JJiscretionary Justice, Bl YALE L.J. 575 (1972). Under a revived delegation
doctrine, one wonders whether the Order's cost-benefit injunction, if ratified by Congress,
could withstand scrutiny. The ambiguity of cost-benefit analysis raises serious questions concerning the intelligibility of the delegated standard.
85. Directives of this sort should be distinguished from procedural or substantive directives. In contrast to substantive measures, facilitative measures are not intended to affect the
agencies' policy orientation. Unlike procedural directives, facilitative directives do not require
the agency to change its decision-making process. Facilitative measures create opportunities
rather than impose mandatory procedures.
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ral requirements have a substantive effect, however, they clearly intrude on the legislative character of rulemaking.
Executive Order 12,291 sets up a framework for management of
the administrative rulemaking process that is unprecedented in scope
and substance. The Order establishes conception-to-grave oversight
of the rulemaking of all covered agencies, and concentrates effective
operational authority in one agency, the 0MB. This coordinating
agency is vested with the power to define and implement a uniform
methodology and system of standards by which all important regulatory action is to be judged. The substantive impact of this single
standard of assessment is apparent. The Order declares that
"[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,"86 and that "[r]egulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize
the net benefits to society."87 It thus fails to recognize that Congress,
in creating administrative agencies, has itself weighed certain costs
and benefits and established general policy goals. Implicit in the notion of an agency's statutory mandate or mission is a congressional
instruction to attribute special weight to particular concerns. 88 Executive Order 12,291, however, in effect commands agencies to undertake a de novo balancing of factors that Congress has already
considered.
The so-called cotton-dust case, American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. JJonovan, 89 nicely demonstrates this point. In that
case, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
had promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust. The textile industry challenged the regulation, essentially
claiming that OSHA was required to find that the benefits of the
standard outweighed its costs. In rejecting the industry's argument,
the Supreme Court held that Congress had instructed OSHA to use a
feasibility, not a cost-benefit, standard when drafting its rules. 90 The
cotton-dust case vividly illustrates that the cost-benefit principle, like
a principle requiring special concern for worker safety, affects the
substance of agency rulemaking. Executive Order 12,291 gives the
President power to shape substantive domestic policies and thus con86. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
87. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
88. See Sagolf, Economic 77zeory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1396-97,
1419 n.lll (1981).
89. IOI S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
90. IOI S. Ct. at 2490.
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stitutes a significant intrusion on an area properly entrusted to
Congress.
The Justice Department memorandum supporting the Order
concedes that it imposes both procedural and substantive requirements, but contends that these requirements do not unlawfully displace congressional or agency authority. The memorandum
identifies the Regulatory Impact Analysis requirement as a procedural requirement, ''which . . . is at most an indirect constraint on the
exercise of statutory discretion." 91 The Justice Department categorizes the requirement that agencies exercise their discretion in accordance with ''the principles of cost-benefit analysis" as substantive
in nature,92 but argues that the Order does not conflict with statutes
that explicitly preclude decisions based on cost-benefit assessments
since it recognizes an exception where adherence to its requirements
is precluded by law. 93 Finally, the memorandum finds that the functions of the 0MB and the Task Force are supervisory only; the tasks
delegated to those bodies do not suggest authority to reject an
agency's ultimate judgment.
This attempt to justify the Order is unpersuasive. The Justice
Department treats two specific requirements of the Order and the
general supervisory functions devolved on the 0MB and the Task
Force as isolated aspects of the displacement of discretion issue. The
Order, however, is a complex, interrelated series of prescriptions and
functions that, taken as a whole, establishes an integrated system of
management for a substantial portion of the Executive Branch's
rulemaking activities. Thus, the requirement that an agency prepare
a Regulatory Impact Analysis assessing the costs and benefits of major rules, standing alone, may be properly characterized as procedural. That requirement is relatively innocuous legally until it is seen
as part of a mandatory assessment process that evaluates rules for
their consistency with ''the principles of cost-benefit analysis." Even
then, the conclusion that sufficient discretion is left with executive
officials is plausible since it may be conceded that there is no single
set of cost-benefit principles applicable to all situations. 94 But these
91. Simms Memo, supra note 66, at 5.
92. Id
93. Id at 6. Where a statute is silent, however, an agency decision-maker is free to consider such factors and the President is within his supervisory authority to see that the decisionmaker considers it. As it is the agency head, and not the President, who makes the calculation
under the Order, that officer retains considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory
action should be taken. Id
94. q: STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON IN•
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D Sess., CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WONDER TOOL OR MIRAGE? (Comm. Print 1980) (describing shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis
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two requirements do not stand alone. In the context of the unfettered authority that the 0MB may wield under the Order,95 the inevitable effect of the application of these substantive principles could
be the displacement of ultimate agency discretion in contravention
of any statute vesting discretionary rulemaking authority in an
agency official. Executive Order 12,291 prescribes exactly how
agency decisions are to be- made: Legitimate agency action can occur only where the potential benefits exceed the potential costs. The
Order's declaration that it applies only to the extent permitted by law
does not alter its substantive character. This exception permits an
agency to forgo cost-benefit analysis only if its underlying statute
explicitly forbids such balancing. Yet where, due to the ambiguity of
the congressional· delegation or some other reason, the applicable
statute does not direct an agency to use a particular methodology,
adherence to the Order will undoubtedly shape the substance of
agency regulations. In such cases, the Order's cost-benefit principle
directs an agency to consider a broad range of factors and, more
important, determines how the agency should value each factor. The
Order thus limits the permissible range of agency action and, by enjoining agencies to maximize net benefits, implies that there is one
"right" response in each rulemaking situation. Agencies, of course,
in certain situations). Cost-benefit analysis has also been criticized as biased against regulation
because it systematically understates the value of benefits that are not amenable to numerical
quantification. Douglas Costle, the EPA Administrator during the Carter administration,
explained:
A third difficulty in benefit measurement is the most difficult of all: translating certain
kinds of physical benefits, such as reduced sickness or the prevention of premature death,
into dollar terms. In other words, what is the economic value of a longer and healthier
life?
Because of these analytical problems, health effects and their economic valuation remain speculative. We cannot pin them down . . . and in the meantime, business and
government officials can point to the dollar-costs of controls that federal regulation requires. The upshot is that, while our critics consistently appear no-nonsense fellows with
their feet on the ground, environmental regulators come across as a bunch of bureaucratic
flower-children intent on recreating the Garden of Eden.
Costle, Stop J)emagogue,y on Cost-Benefit Analysis, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Apr. 9, 1979, at
32.
95. The rulemaking authority vested in the Director of the 0MB allows him to "[p]repare
and promulgate uniform standards for . . . the development of Regulatory Impact Analyses."
Exec. Order 12,291 § 6(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (1981). Thus, whether such standards are government-wide or individually tailored to an agency, agency-head discretion is
diminished in a degree not accounted for in the memoi:andum's conclusion that "[t]he agency
would thus retain considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory action is justified
and what form such action should take," Simms Memo, supra note 66, at 6, since "the principles of cost-benefit analysis" may be selected for the agency requiring little more than simply
ministerial application. Finally, § 2(b) of the Order appears to enjoin all subject agencies to
take no "[r)egulatory action . . . unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society." Initial implementation of this directive, of course, falls to
the Director. In the face of this directive, will the Director, after developing cost-benefit principles, fail to attempt to ensure their proper application to the fullest extent of his authority?
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retain some discretion in the application of the notoriously ambiguous cost-benefit methodology. 96 But even this residual discretion is
limited since the Order authorizes the Director of the 0MB to promulgate a uniform methodology for cost-benefit analyses. 97 Moreover, the Order also creates a formal "review" mechanism through
which the White House can market its views concerning the agencies' applications of the cost-benefit principles.98 By requiring most
agencies to use a uniform cost-benefit methodology and subjecting
their application of that methodology to correction, albeit formally
unenforced, by the White House, the Order substantially interferes
with agencies' discretion and directly affects the substance of administrative policy-making. One might hope that Congress will more
explicitly specify the factors that agencies must consider and the
weight that they must attribute to those factors. The proper response
to this concern, however, is to require that Congress delegate power
according to definite standards, not to shift policy-making authority
to the President wherever those standards are indefinite. 99
Comparing Executive Order 12,291 to recent presidential initiatives in the area highlights the degree of the Order's intrusion on
agency discretion and Congress's domestic policy-making function.
Like President Reagan, recent presidents have sought to direct agencies' attention to factors beyond their narrow statutory purview. 100
96. See note 94 supra.
97. Exec. Order 12,291 § 6(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (1981).
98. The Justice Department's suggestion that agency discretion is somehow preserved because the Order contains no sanctions for either disregarding the views of the White House or
failing to comply with the order's requirements, Simms Memo, supra note 66, at 6-7, must be
rejected. The presumption must be made that the agency will heed the Order's requirements
- it has the force of law - and be influenced by the views of the White House. Otherwise,
the Order is pointless. This adherence to the views of the White House will prove particularly
troublesome if, as Representative Waxman suspects, the Administration uses "cost-benefit
analysis to reach decisions that will favor business and industry in this country rather than the
public." N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 3. In that event, cost-benefit analysis "will be a
political tool rather than a regulatory tool." Id
99. See note 85 supra.
100. During the Nixon Administration, for example, the 0MB instituted a system of Quality of Life Review. Although it was theoretically applicable to all agencies with jurisdiction
over environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and
safety, review focused almost exclusively on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. See generally J. QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA 117-42 (1976).
Quality of Life r.rocedures required all EPA regulations to be processed through an inter-.
agency review both before such regulations were issued as proposals for public comment and
again before the regulations were promulgated in final form. The 0MB coordinated the review which involved the circulation of draft regulations to all interested departments and
agencies and an allowance of time, often four weeks or more, for the preparation of comments,
followed by meetings at the staff level to resolve any questions raised. The 0MB controlled
the decision whether or not to require additional time for completion of agency review or to
hold additional meetings to resolve disputes. The Department of Commerce was apparently a
frequent and hostile participant, often reflecting indirectly the opposition to proposed EPA
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President Ford's Executive Order 11,821, 101 for example, required all
executive agencies to assess the inflationary impact of proposed regulations.102 President Carter issued an order of even broader scope.
His Executive Order 12,044103 required that agencies address the anticipated economic impact of certain rules and detail available alternatives.104 Neither of these earlier orders, it should be noted,
rules. See Bruff, supra note 26, at 464. If there was dissatisfaction with the EPA's resolution of
disputed issues, further meetings, presided over by 0MB officials and often attended by White
House staff, were called to resolve the conflicts. Id at 464-65. It is estimated that it took at
least two years for significant environmental regulations to be finalized. See Executive Branch
Review ofEnvironmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Regulation ofthe Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-76 (1979)
(statement of John Quarles) [hereinafter cited as Quarles testimony).
Quality of Life Review was highly controversial throughout its existence. Proponents contended that any delay in the rulemaking process was justified by the improved quality of both
the regulations and the supporting analyses produced by the agency to justify its proposals.
These improvements were directly attributed to the searching comments and critiques of sister
agencies. Bruff, supra note 26, at 465. Critics contended that the review unnecessarily extended the rulemaking process and allowed many important comments and discussions to occur off the public record, thereby depriving the system of the full benefits of public debate.
Furthermore, it was contended that the system in actuality often resulted in behind the scenes
resolutions to accommodate objections of other agencies. This, assertedly, was contrary to the
statutory assignment of ultimate decision-making authority to the Administrator of the EPA
and distorted the public perception of the locus of that final authority. See Quarles Testimony,
supra, at 63-66; Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External Review, 1 ENVIR. REP. (BNA), Sept. 3, 1976, at 693, 694-97.
Quality of Life Review was ended on January 25, 1977, by the Acting Administrator of the
EPA. There was no reported court challenge to the validity of the review system.
101. 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975 Comp.), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 app., at 592 (1976),
extended to December 31, 1977, by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977), reprinted In
12 U.S.C. § 1904 app., at 592 (1976).
102. The impact statements prepared under this directive were reviewed by the President's
Council on Wage and Price Stability, but that body had no power to mandate changes in the
rules. There is some indication that the Order stimulated improvement in the economic analysis of some affected agencies and may have influenced some agency decisions. See AMERICAN
BAR AssocJATION, COMMISSION ON LAW AND ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION 85 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as ABA "STUDY]; Note, The I'!flatlon Impact Statement Program.· An Assessment of the First Two Years, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 1138, 1160-62 (1977).
103. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553 app., at 107 (Supp. III 1979).
104. The Order attempted to ensure more meaningful public participation in informal
rulemaking by setting a minimum 60-day comment period in certain cases. It also provided
for review of "significant" proposed rules by the promulgating agency. Under certain circumstances, agencies were required to analyze the anticipated impact of a proposed rule and to
detail their consideration of the available alternative approaches. The agencies themselves
determined whether a rule was significant and developed the procedures for preparing regulatory analyses. They were also required to prepare semi-annual agendas of forthcoming
rulemaking proceedings. Oversight of the performance of the agencies was lodged in three
institutional entities: the Regulatory Council, the Council on Wage and Price Stability
(COWPS), and the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG). The Regulatory Council,
which consisted of the heads of all executive departments and agencies and those independent
regulatory agency heads who desired to participate, played two roles. It collected information
from agencies about major pending and proposed rules and published it semiannually in the
Regulatory Calendar. It also served as a prescreening body for proposed rules, allowing agencies to coordinate rulemaking to avoid duplication of effort or contradictions of policy.
RARG, composed of representatives from all economic and regulatory agencies, chaired by
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and staffed by individuals from COWPS,
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interfered with the agencies' discretion to decide how to balance the
additional information that they were required to generate. President Reagan's order stands alone in commanding that cost-benefit
principles, rather than an agency's perception of its statutory mission, should guide administrative policy-making.
Executive Order 12,291 is also more intrusive than the presidential intervention in informal rulemaking recently sanctioned by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Sierra Club v.
Costle, 105 the D.C. Circuit upheld the legitimacy of discussions between the President and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) during the postcomment period of informal rulemaking. The
Court rejected statutory and due process challenges to the oral contacts, stating:
Our form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other
and from the Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always
have the answers to complex regulatory problems. An overworked administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but zealous staff
needs to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in other agencies as well as in the White House. 106

Although the Court did not expressly address the separation of powers issue, the oral contacts present in Sierra Club can, for separation
of powers purposes, be distinguished from the presidential intervention contemplated by Executive Order 12,291. In Sierra Club, the
EPA apparently retained discretion to decide what weight, if any, to
accord President Carter's policy suggestions. Executive Order
12,291, in contrast, is a presidential command regarding the method
of decision that agencies must use. In addition to creating a formalized mechanism through which the President's policies can be communicated and, to some extent, enforced, the Order permits the
President, through the Director of the 0MB, to comment on how the
agency makes its decision. While the Sierra Club communications
had the task of selecting from 10 to 20 of the agencies' regulatory analyses for independent
review and comment. The comments were to be filed during the public comment period of the
rulemaking and made part of the record. But, as with the Ford Order, Executive Order 12,044
vested no formal enforcement authority in any governmental body outside of the subject agencies. It also provided no central standard setting and performance evaluation mechanism by
which to judge the efficacy of the regulatory analyses that the agencies were required to perform. The Order depended entirely on hortatory means for achieving compliance, a task made
most difficult by the presence of the subject agency on the interagency groups.
For a critique of the Carter Order program, see DeMuth, Cons/raining Regulatory Costs:
Part I, The While House Programs, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1980, at 13-26; lJeregulalion HQ:
An Interview with Murray L Weidenhaum and James C Miller III, supra note 9, at 14-16.
105. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
106. 657 F.2d at 406.
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substantially preserved the agency's policy-making discretion, Executive Order 12,291 largely displaces that discretion.
Recent legislation proposed in Congress provides a final illustration of the Order's interference with the prerogatives of the legislature. A number of proposed amendments to the APA have recently
been circulated in Congress. Several of these proposals deserve special mention. One bill, championed by Senator Lloyd Bentsen and
Representative Clarence Brown, parallels President Reagan's order
and requires that federal agencies proposing regulation select the
most cost-effective method of meeting regulatory objectives. 107 A
second bill, unanimously reported out of Senate Committee in 1980,
explicitly rejects a cost-benefit requirement as "both unworkable and
undesirable." 108 The Senate Report states:
·
This Committee recognizes the inadequacy of any strict cost/benefit
analysis. The goal of regulatory reform is not the elimination of regulation, nor is it intended to slow regulation to a halt by requiring agencies to justify their regulations through unrealistic and cumbersome
cost/benefit requirements. Rather, it is an effort to develop a mechanism for developing economically feasible methods of regulation consistent with important societal goals.1°9

The Senate Report and the two competing bills highlight the danger
that the President, by acting in an area of congressional controversy,
will reach a different result than the one that Congress would otherwise adopt. 110 In fact, even the Bentsen-Brown bill differs from
President Reagan's order. The bill does not direct agencies to calcu107. H.R. 75, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
108. Reform of Federal Regulation Act, S.262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
109. S. REP. No. 96-4018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2 at 20 (1980). The value of cost-benefit
analysis has been hotly debated. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 1. A House subcommittee has extensively considered the merits of cost-benefit analysis. While not condemning
all uses of this tool, the subcommittee's conclusion summarizes the state of the art:
Proponents of the use of cost-benefit analysis suggest that by adding up all the projected
costs and the projected benefits of a giyen regulation, we can-determine whether a proposed regulation is worth implementing. However, this report has documented numerous
theoretical and practical shortcomings in trying to do a cost-benefit analysis. Even if all
analysts were brilliant and public-spirited, it would be impossible to do a cost-benefit
analysis that would accurately predict the effects of a given proposal. Moreover, such
analyses do not deal with the equity factor, that the costs and benefits of a given regulation often accrue to different people. In short, the Subcommittee believes that all available
evidence suggests that formal cost-benefit analysis is simply too primitive a tool to make a
decisive factor in rulemaking.
SUBCOMM, ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WONDER TOOL. OR MIRAGE? 32 (Comm.

Print 1980).
110. The Regulatory Reform Act, the bill now pending in the Senate, contains cost-benefit
provisions similar to those in Executive Order 12,291 - a fact undoubtedly due in part to the
issuance of the Order. The bill requires that rulemaking agencies determine "that the benefits
of the rule justify the costs of the rule, and that the rule will substantially achieve the rule
making objectives in a more cost-effective manner than the alternatives described in the rule
making." S. 1080, § 621(d)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). An amendment to S. 1080 intro-
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late benefits because, in the words of Representative Brown, "Congress generally presumes or sets a level of benefits to be achieved"; 111
the bill merely enjoins agencies to use the lowest cost method of attaining presumed benefits. 112 In any case, it is highly inappropriate
for the President, by executive fiat, to attempt to resolve this important legislative debate. That President Reagan has done so demonstrates the significance of his intrusion on the legislative domain.
All three factors reviewed above - the institutional competence
of the President, the proper roles of the legislature and the Chief
Executive, and the degree of the Order's intrusion on the role of the
legislature - argue against according the President unilateral authority to enact Executive Order 12,291. Casting the argument in
Justice Jackson's language, strong reasons exist for viewing the Order as within Congress's exclusive domain; the Order may thus be
sustained only if an express or implied congressional delegation of
authority may be discerned.
duced by Senator Laxalt includes identical language. Amendment No. 640 to S. 1080,
§ 622(d)(2)(B), 127 CONG. REC. Sl4,132 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1981).
This cost-benefit provision is less constricting than§ 2 of Executive Order 12,291. Unlike
the Order, the Senate bill requires neither that benefits exceed costs nor that net benefits be
maximal.
At least one regulatory reform bill now before the House contains a cost-benefit provision
that is even more flexible than the Senate version. The House bill, sponsored by Representative Danielson, requires that an agency explain "how the benefits of the rule bear a reasonable
relationship to the costs and other effects of the rule," and ''why the rule attains its objectives,
in a manner consistent with applicable statutes, with less adverse economic effects than other
alternatives considered. . . ." Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 746,
§ 622(c)(5)(6A), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Although both bills would give oversight authority to the President, they place greater
limits on that authority than does Executive Order 12,291. First, in contrast to the Order,
neither bill permits the President or his staff to delay indefinitely promulgation of proposed or
final rules. The Senate bill stipulates that if Presidential review of agency regulatory analysis
is established, "such reviews must be concluded within one hundred and twenty days following
the receipt of the relevant draft rules and analyses." S. 1080, § 624(a)(l), 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981). The House proposal states that all compliance procedures established by the director
of the 0MB "shall be consistent with the prompt completion ofrulemaking proceedings..•."
Amendment in the Nature of Substitute to H.R. 746, § 624(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
Second, both bills provide for public comment before executive oversight procedures are
adopted. Third, the Senate bill declares that "Any exercise of authority by the President concerning proposed or final major rules or associated regulatory analyses of an independent regulatory agency pursuant to subsection (1) shall he limited to nonhinding advisory
recommendations." S. 1080, § 624(a)(2), 97th Cong., l!it_Sess. (1981) (emphasis added).
The final form of the regulatory reform legislation or even whether Congress will enact any
new legislation cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, it appears that, in addition to differing substantially from the APA (the most recent comprehensive legislation regarding informal
rulemaking), see notes 140-64 infta and accompanying text, Executive Order 12,291 also differs
from any new legislation that Congress is likely to approve.
111. Brown, A More .Demanding Standard· The Brown-Bentsen Bills, REGULATION,
May/June 1979, at 20, 22.
112. See id
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B. Has Congress Delegated Authority?
In the absence of express or implied constitutional authority, support for Executive Order 12,291 must be found in a congressional
grant of authority. Since Congress has made no directly applicable
statutory grant, that authority must be implied from relevant legislation or congressional practice. In view of Executive Order 12,29l's
substantive ramifications, the need to maintain the constitutional
separation of powers demands that the implication be clear, convincing, and unmistakable. Congress has nowhere stated the role that
the President should play in the control of informal rulemaking, but
its intent can be inferred from several sources, the most prominent of
which include the President's budgetary and reorganizational powers, use of the legislative veto over certain agency rules, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Rather than establishing the requisite
authorization for the Order, these sources convincingly demonstrate
Congress's intention to exclude the President from a policy-making
role in the administrative process.
1. Presidential Budgetary and Reorganizational Powers
Since early in this century, the President, with Congress's blessing, has wielded a great deal of authority over the agency budget
process. Through his budget office, the President has been authorized to present a unified annual budget on behalf of federal agencies,
clear agency information requests, and even decide which legislative
proposals urged by the agencies should receive congressional attention. The scope of the control over administrative policy-making
that these powers confer has fluctuated over the years.
Presidential authority in the agency budget process began with
the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 113 which
allowed the President to formulate a national budget with the assistance of a newly created Bureau of the Budget (BOB). Previously,
each agency had submitted its annual budget request directly to
Congress. Finding this process inefficient and unwieldy, Congress
created the BOB to review the morass of agency budgetary information and to approve agency budget requests. 114 By 1970, _the_J3DJ3
possessed an impressive array of legal authorities for supervision of
113. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified throughout 31 U.S.C.). The Office of Management
and Budget was created by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1070 (1966-1970
Compilation), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 16 app., at 1197 (1976) and in 84 Stat. 2085 (1970).
114. See generally L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, ch. l (1975).
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nearly all departments and agencies. 115 In addition to reviewing and
approving agency budget requests, the Bureau was authorized to
study agency organization, to clear agency proposals for legislation
or agency comments on proposed legislation, 116 and to control agencies' requests for information.• •1
In granting these powers to the President, Congress intended at least in part - that he would play a policy-neutral role; the President was to coordinate the vast tangle of administrative agencies.
Through his authority to study agency organization and review
budget requests, the President could identify overlapping efforts,
eliminate needless duplication, and resolve interagency conflicts.
One must recognize, however, that the powers that enabled the President to carry out his managerial responsibilities also gave him the
capacity to influence administrative policy. In the threat of budget
reductions, the President possesses a powerful tool that he can use to
enforce his own policy designs. The President could, moreover, use
his clearance powers to focus congressional attention on agency proposals or comments agreeable to him. Yet the BOB, notwithstanding
its significant policy-influencing potential, maintained an image of
bipartisan neutrality, and its Director was seen as a personal technical adviser on fiscal and organizational matters. 118 Although, in
principle, the President has long been able to influence substantively
the policies formulated by administrative agencies, until recently the
power was relatively dormant.
In 1970, however, President Nixon reconstituted the BOB as the
OMB 119 and sought to expand its role.1 20 Departing from the history
115. Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, tit. II, 53 Stat. 565 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 2
(1976)).
116. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, 6
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 353 (Mar. 16, 1970), reprinted in 31 u.s.c. § 16 app., at 1198
(1976). The requirement oflegislative clearance does not appear to be legislatively based but
has been an accepted practice since 1937. See Bureau of Budget Circular No. 344 (Nov. 15,
1937). The present version of this policy appears in 0MB Circular No. A-19 (Sept. 20, 1979).
117. Federal Reports Act of 1942, ch. 811, 56 Stat. 1078 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 35013511 (1976)).
118. Indeed, the Director was not even subject to Senate confirmation. SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, REOU•
LATORY ORGANIZATION 43 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL REGULATION
STUDY).
.
119. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1070 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted
in 31 U.S.C. § 16 app., at 1197 (1976), and in 84 Stat. 2085.
120. The OMB's ostensible purpose was to take a more active role in the evaluation of
program performance and to judge the overall effectiveness of the programs from a central
perspective. President's Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, 6
WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 353 (Mar. 16, 1970), reprinted in 31 u.s.c. § 16 app., at 1198
(1976).
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of policy-neutrality, President Nixon began to use the 0MB, together with his self-proclaimed impoundm.ent powers, to alter or end
established programs. 121 As the 0MB began to be viewed as a political instrument of the President, 122 Congress's response to President
Nixon's unprecedented efforts was far-reaching; the legislature severely limited the OMB's autonomy and forcefully asserted its own
desire to control administrative policy-making. For the first time,
Congress required Senate confirmation of the OMB's Director and
Deputy Director. 123 The OMB's monopoly on the processing of
agency budget requests was ended as Congress created its own central budget evaluator, the Congressional Budget Office (CB0). 124
Congress has, on a selective basis, either eliminated the requirement
that the 0MB clear agency budget requests or mandated that the
requests be concurrently submitted to the CB0. 125 Equally signifi121. See L. FtsHER, supra note 114, ai 147-74.
122. FEDERAL REGULATION STUDY, supra note I 18, at 43-44.
123. Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, 88 Stat. 11 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976)).
124. 2 u.s.c. §§ 601-604 (1976).
125. Since 1973, Congress has mandated that the budget requests of the U.S. Postal Service, see Act of June 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-328, § 23, 88 Stat. 287 (codified at 39 U.S.C.
§ 2009 (1976)), and the U.S. International Trade Commission, see Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, § 175(a)(l), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (1976)), be submitted
to Congress without revision, and that the budget requests and legislative proposals of other
agencies be submitted concurrently to 0MB. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93579, § 5(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896 (reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 522a app., at 318 (1976)) (Privacy Protection Study Commission); Commodity Future Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-463, § 10l(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a(h)(l)-(2) (1976)) (Commodity Future Trading Commission); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 27(k),
86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2076 (k) (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, § 304(b)(7), 88 Stat.
2156 (1975) (codified at49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(7)(1976)) (National Transportation Safety Board);
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 202(a), 92 Stat. 1122 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 1205(j) (Supp. III 1979)) (Merit Systems Protections Board); Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 311, 90 Stat. 60 (codified at 31
U.S.C. § l l(j) (1976)) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Department of Energy Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(j) (Supp. III 1979)) (Federal, En_ergy Regulatory Commission); AMTRAK Improvement Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-146, § 12,
87 Stat. 553 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 601(d) (1976)) (National Railroad Passenger Corporation);
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 2021, 87 Stat. 990 (codified at
45 U.S.C. § 712(g) (1976)) (U.S. Railway Association) Section 111 of the Act of Oct. 28, 1974,
exempts the following agencies from clearance oflegislative proposals and comments: Securities and Exchange Commission, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Credit
Union Administration. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § Ill, 88 Stat. 1500 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 250 (1976)).
Until 1973, the requirement of clearance of information-gathering requests extended to
independent regulatory agencies. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. IV,§ 409, 87
Stat. 593 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (1976)). Congress has since returned partial control
over the independents to the 0MB. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94
Stat. 2819 (codified at 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1981)). 0MB may now veto
collection requests by independent regulatory commissions but the veto may be overriden by a
majority vote of the subject commission. See 44 U.S.C.A. &3507(c) (West Supp. 1981).
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cant was the enactment of the Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974, 126 which greatly limited the President's putative authority to impound agency funds and his concomitant power to shape
policy. 127 Finally, Congress countered the institutional development
of the 0MB by enhancing the authority of its watchdog audit
agency, the General Accounting Office, with program evaluation
functions and a special oversight role in preventing presidential impoundments.128 The spate of legislation following the politicization
of the 0MB conclusively demonstrates that Congress, rather than
acquiescing to presidential policy-making, desired to maintain control over administrative agencies. Congress has empowered the
President to act in the interests of coordination and organizational
efficiency, but has carefully restrained such action, lest it assume
substantive policy dimensions.
Congressional limitations on the President's reorganizational
powers reiterate the theme that the President's managerial role does
not encompass control of administrative policy-making. Congress
has several times delegated to the President extensive powers of governmental reorganization. 129 The policy-making potential stemming
from these powers was great: The President typically could transfer,
consolidate, or abolish agency functions, including rulemaking. 130
In principle, the President could have transferred rulemaking programs from one agency to another possessing a fundamentally different mission. Hesitant to confer power with such potential
substantive impact, Congress has imposed several conditions on the
President's reorganizational authority. First, all of the reorganization acts have been of limited duration, none being effective for more
126. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in part at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407 (1976)).
The Act was passed in response to President Nixon's assertion that he had inherent authority
to impound appropriated funds. See Local 2677, American Federation of Government Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973), holding that the President had no inherent
authority to impound. All other reported cases dealt with whether the statute in question
specifically permitted impoundment. These opinions generally held that impoundment was
not allowed. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 136 (1975); Pennsylvania v. Lynn,
501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State Highway Commn. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
127. The statute severely restricts the Executive's power to impound. Although it allows
for the possibility of deferral or rescission and short (45 days) periods when agency spending
can be suspended, all impoundment actions are subject to a one-House veto and agency spending is under constant surveillance by the Comptroller General, who has authority to seek court
assistance in the face of violation of the provisions of the Act. 31 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
128. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 1405-1406 (1976) (provision for oversight and court action by
Comptroller General on impoundments); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1157 (1976) (program evaluation
authority).
129. Reorganization plans submitted by the President take effect if not vetoed by either
House of Congress within a specified period. Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17,
§ 2, 91 Stat. 32 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II 1978)).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
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than four years. 131 Second, some of the acts specifically restricted
reorganizational power. illustratively, the most recent reorganization act, which lapsed on April 7, 1981, expressly prohibited the
President from abolishing "any enforcement or statutory program," 132 creating any new executive departments, or consolidating
two or more departments. 133 Third, with two short-lived exceptions,
all of the reorganization acts adopted since 1932 have included provisions authorizing a legislative veto. 134 Each of these restrictions,
and particularly the provisions for a legislative veto, reflect Congress's intent to cabin even the potential for presidential control of
administratively formulated policy.
2.

Congress's Use of the Legislative Veto

Perhaps the clearest and most eagerly pursued congressional indication of its desire to maintain control over administrative decision-making in general and agency rulemaking in particular is its
acceptance and utilization of the legislative veto. 135 Congress has
used the legislative veto not only to prevent the President from indirectly controlling the substance of agency policy, but also to increase
it~.,own control over the administrative process. Since 1932, 193 acts
of Congress have contained 272 separate provisions giving the legislature direct review powers of s~me description. Of that number,
substantially more than half have been enacted since 1970. In 1980
alone, Congress passed seventeen acts containing thirty-eight veto
provisions. 136 Moreover, the nature and scope of the review has
131. The authority was allowed to lapse in April 1973 and was not revived until April
1977. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON THE RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF THE COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE VETO}.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(l) (Supp. II 1978).
134. One exception is found in the Economy Act of 1933, ch. 212, § 403(c), 47 Stat. 1489,
which gave President Roosevelt unfettered reorganization authority. See generally LEGISLATIVE VETO, supra note 131, at 164. The other appears in the First War Powers Act of Dec.
1941, ch. 593, tit. I, 55 Stat. 838.
135. Briefly, a legislative veto is a statutorily authorized means by which the Congress, or a
part ofit, such as one House, a committee, or a committee chairman, may subject proposals for
Executive action pursuant to statute to further legislative consideration and control In its most
controversial form, a proposal must be either reformulated or abandoned. But common to all
varieties of the veto mechanism is the inability of the President to counter-veto a congressional
rejection.
136. Norton, Statistical Summary of Congressional Approval and Disapproval Legislation,
1932-1982 (CRS, Sept. 13, 1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). For a comprehensive compilation oflegislative veto provisions see Norton, Congressional Review, Deferral,
and Disapproval of Executive Actions: A Summary and Inventory of Statutory Authority
(CRS, April 30, 1976) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Norton, 1976-1977 Congressional Acts Authorizing Prior Review, Approval, and Disapproval of Proposed Executive
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changed markedly. In the past, legislative veto provisions have usually been selective, directed to some or all actions encompassed by a
particular statute or program. More recently, Congress has considered proposals with a vastly broader sweep. In May 1980, for example, Congress subjected all trade regulation rules of the Federal
Trade Commission to legislative scrutiny. 137 And bills that would
apply the legislative veto to the proposed rules of all agencies have
received serious consideration. 138 Besides indicating that Congress
desires to exercise ultimate control over administrative policymaking, the dramatically increased reliance on the legislative veto
signals an intention to exclude presidential action from this sphere.
Because the veto is accomplished without presidential assent or involvement, its inherent nature is antithetical to executive control of
agency rulemaking. Indeed, some commentators have raised constitutional objections against the legislative veto, claiming that it deprives the President of his constitutional power to veto legislation. 139
Congress's use of the legislative veto, like its treatment of the
Actions (CRS, May 25, 1978) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Norton, 1979 Acts
Authorizing, Approval or Disapproval, or Requiring Advance Notice, of Proposed Executive
Actions, Rules and Regulations (CRS, April 17, 1980) (copy on file with the Michigan Law
Review). Not all legislative veto provisions are still effective. Brief for the U.S. Senate, Appellee-Petitioner at Addendum I (identifying 56 statutes currently in effect that contain legislative
veto provisions-the list, however, appears incomplete), Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171).
137. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21, 94
Stat. 374,393 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l (Supp. IV 1980)), In the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1207, 95 Stat. 718 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2083), similar
review was imposed on all rules to be promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
138. See, e.g., H.R. 512, H.R. 601, and H.R. 1776 (96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979). In the 97th
Congress, see S. 382, S. 890, H.R. 1776, and H.R. 3740 (97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981).
139. Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation ofPowers: The Executive on a Leash?,
56 N.C. L. REV. 423 (1978); Ginnane, The Control ofFederal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Commillees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953). These objections are based primarily upon the separation of powers principle and the specific constitutional requirements that
both Houses of Congress participate in the lawmaking process and that the President have an
oportunity to veto the product of that process. There has as yet been no definitive judicial
resolution of the issue. Two cases have been decided on the merits. In Atkins v. United States,
556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), a divided Court of Claims
upheld the one-House veto provision of the Salary Act. In Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), appealfiled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3865 (U.S. May 19, 1981)
(No. 80-1832) the court struck down a one-House veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act on separation of powers grounds.
The continuing uncertainty as to the veto's validity, combined with persistent Executive
opposition to its application and doubts as to its practicality as a mechanism to manage and
control administrative action on a broad scale, have raised serious. questions as to its long
range utility. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR EsTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES 2834 (Comm. Print 1980); Bruff & Gellhom, Congressional Control ofAdministrative Regula/Ion:
A Study ofLegislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1977); McGowan, Congress, Court, and
Control of .Delegated Power, 11 CoLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977).
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0MB and governmental reorganization, reveals a coherent conception of the President's role in the administrative process. Congress
has delegated to the President tasks that it cannot effectively perform
- coordinating the welter of administrative agencies, organizing the
haphazardly created bureaucracy more efficiently, avoiding duplicative efforts, and eliminating needless conflict. The President's authorized concern for "efficiency," however, justifies ensuring that
agencies successfully execute their tasks, not measuring agency-formulated policy according to cost-benefit ratios. As the
counterweights that Congress has developed to the 0MB and the
President's reorganization powers demonstrate, Congress has denied
the President leeway to shape administrative policy-making in any
direct and significant way. The legislative veto, a device that excludes presidential participation entirely, signifies Congress's judgment that it alone should shape the course of domestic policy.
3. The Administrative Procedure Act

In addition to the sources discussed above, the Adminstrative
Procedure Act 140 (APA) supports an argument that Executive Order
12,291 contradicts the will of Congress. The first part of this twopart argument builds on the theme already developed, concluding
that, like the other available indicators of legislative intent, the Act
denies the President authority to control the substance of administrative policy-making. Although the Act is silent on the permissibility
of presidential intervention, the evidence suggests that Congress objected to a formalized presidential presence in rulemaking, especially
where the possibility of substantive policy influence exists. Both
before and after passage of the Act, Congress considered proposals
that, like Executive Order 12,291, concentrated authority to evaluate
agency performance in a central oversight body. The 1941 Report of
the Attorney General's Committee ·on :Adrnroistrative Procedure, 141
the source of many of the Act's provisions, recommended the creation of an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure. Sitting atop
the bureaucratic maze, this superagency was ''to study and coordinate administrative procedures, and in general through continuing
studies and periodical recommendations, to achieve and stimulate
practical improvements in a manner not possible through omnibus
legislation." 142 Although the Office apparently would have had no

u.s.c.

140. 5
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
141. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT (1941) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
142. Id at 6.
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power to promulgate and enforce a uniform methodology by which
agencies would review proposed rules, the Committee's Report contemplated that the Office would be authorized to oversee the entire
agency decision-making process and to require additional procedures, some of the powers now claimed by President Reagan. The
proposal for an Office with centralized oversight power was rejected
in the Senate, apparently because of fear that "such an office . . .
will be political, will interfere with the independent operation of
boards and commissions, [and] will constitute a superadministrative
agency." 143 The fear that the Office would unduly politicize the
agency decision-making process applies a fortiori to an oversight
mechanism that, in addition to imposing new procedures, seeks to
enforce an outcome-influencing methodology.
Two other proposals also deserve mention. First, the Brownlow
Report, 144 a 1936 study that served as a springboard for congressional discussion of the Act, 145 recommended that the executive
branch be reorganized to create an integrated, hierarchical structure
over which the President would preside as an active manager. 146 In
particular, the Report urged that the President's role be expanded by
placing some 100 independent agencies, administrations, boards, and
commissions within the executive department. These independent
agencies, the Report argued, constituted a "headless 'fourth
branch'" acting ''under conditions of virtual irresponsibility," 147
thereby frustrating the President's role as "the general manager of
the United States." As conceived by the Report, the President's role
was more confined than that claimed by President Reagan in Executive Order 12,291. The Report spoke only of the President as an
143. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG,, 1ST SESS., REPORT ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in SENATE COMM, ON
THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY (1946) (hereinafter cited as APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
144. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRA•
TIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) [hereinafter cited as
BROWNLOW REPORT]. The Report was commissioned by President Roosevelt in 1936 to make
a study of administrative management in the federal government. The study was conducted
against a backdrop of opposition to the rapidly proliferating substantive programs of the New
Deal, opposition which took the form of complaints, sometimes well founded, as to the fairness
and regularity of the new agencies' procedures. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 34-35 (2d ed. 1980); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ojAdministrative Procedure, 18 CoLUM. L. REv. 258, 269-70, 273-74 (1978).
145. Both the Senate and House reports on the APA acknowledge the Brownlow Report as
the starting point for understanding the origins of the Act. See S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1945), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 143, at 189; H.R. REP. No.
1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 143,
at 241-42.
146. BROWNLOW REPoRT, supra note 144, at 41-42.
147. Id. at 39-40.
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efficient organizer and coordinator rather than as a source of administrative policy. Nonetheless, contemporary scholars raised constitutional objections to even this more limited notion of the President as
general manager, 148 and, significantly, Congress did not enact the
Report's proposals.
A second proposal to establish the principle of superior administrative control in the President for the entire executive branch was
introduced in the Senate in 1949, shortly after the enactment of the
APA. This bill gave the President sweeping powers to control the
administrative process. Functions vested by law in an agency, the
bill declared, were also "vested in the President," and were exercised
"pursuant to authority . . . derived from delegations by the President." Thus, executive agencies were "at all times subject . . . to the
direction and control of the President." 149 This bill was referred to
the Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments,
where it quietly died. Congress's failure to endorse the proposals of
the Brownlow Report or the Senate bill, admittedly, are not ideal
indicators of its intent. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to
infer intent from Congress's failure to act. Unlike the Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, moreover, the legislative materials offer no glimpse of Congress's reasons
for rejecting the conception of the President's role advanced in the
Brownlow Report or the Senate Bill. Nevertheless, an explanation
that focuses on a desire to minimize the President's policy input is
both plausible and consistent with the other, more explicit evidence
of Congress's intent.
There is admittedly some evidence for the view that "key executive policymakers" were not intended to be "isolated from each other
and from the ChiefExecutive." 150 Since Congress permits the President to appoint the sole director of an executive agency, in contrast
to independent agencies whose several commissioners serve staggered terms, it arguably does not intend that executive agencies be
entirely immune from the President's policy suggestions. Congress's
decision not to forbid ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking,
moreover, can be read to signify an intent to countenance presidential communications with the agencies about proposed rules. The
evidence suggesting congressional approval of informal presidential
148. See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 19, at 1238.
149. General Executive Management Act, S. 942, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). It is interesting to note that this bill would have given the President authority to control the ''time, manner,
and extent" of agencies' performance of their delegated functions.
150. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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suasion, however, falls far short of justifying Executive Order
12,29l's formalized control over administrative policy-making. As
we have seen, a variety of sources - Congress's recent treatment of
the 0MB, the limitations that it has imposed on the President's reorganizational powers, its use of the legislative veto, and the legislative
history of the APA - evince Congress's desire to minimize more
formalized control over agency rulemaking. Certainly no evidence
exists to support the conclusion that Congress has implicitly delegated the President authority to command adoption of a uniform,
substantive methodology that is itself hotly debated within Congress.
The argument presented above suggests that Congress meant to
preclude a formalized presidential policy presence in the administrative process and, by implication, to repose ultimate discretion on policy matters with the agencies. The scheme established by the APA
also supports a second, slightly different argument. The APA, this
argument asserts, gives the agencies considerable managerial discretion, and impliedly prevents the President from imposing procedural
requirements or delaying the timing of agency regulations. 151
The procedural requirements established by the APA for informal rulemaking 152 are few and simple. The agency must publish notice of a proposed rule; allow, at its option, written or oral comments;
and accompany final rules with "a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose." 153 The flexibility of informal rulemaking was a
considered response to an earlier version of the APA, 154 which ap151. See note 149 supra.
152. The Act declares informal rulemaking to be the preferred method of agency rulemaking. Formal rulemaking is limited to those situations where a statute specifically requires it,
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976): ''When rules are required by statute to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title shall apply instead of
this subsection." The Supreme Court has strictly adhered to this statutory preference. See,
e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1976).
154. Critics of the Brownlow Report pushed for a highly judicialized procedural system,
which received its embodiment in the Walter-Logan bill in 1939. S. 915, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,
84 CONG. REC. 668 (1939); H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 CONG. REC. 5561 (1939). With
regard to adjudication, it created a dichotomy between single and multi-headed agencies and
provided for trial-type hearings to be conducted by a three-member hearing board in singleheaded agencies and by a single examiner in multiheaded agencies. Any person "aggrieved"
by a decision of any officer or employer of any agency could demand such a hearing. The
rulemaking section provided that all rules "affecting the rights of persons or property" should
be issued "only after publication of notice and public hearings." Rules under future statutes
were to be issued within one year of the statute's enactment, and rules in existence for less than
three years were to be reconsidered within one year after the bill became law "if any person
substantially interested in the effects" of the rule so requested. Judicial review could be obtained by any person "substantially interested in the effects of any administrative rule" in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to determine whether such rule was in conflict
with the Constitution or the statute under which it was promulgated.
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plied "a procrustean procedural system" 155 to the entire administrative process. President Roosevelt, who vetoed the earlier bill, and,
others criticized the bill because it ignored the "underlying diversities" of agencies "different in structure and function." 156 Recognizing the validity of these objections, Congress designed the APA to
leave "wide latitude for each agency to frame its own procedures." 157
The Act rejects the notion that a central source such as Congress or
the proposed Federal Office of Administrative Procedure should devise extensive and uniform procedures for agency rulemaking. Beyond the statute's minimum requirements, each individual agency
has maximum discretion to fashion procedures that accord with its
perception of "considerations of practicality, necessity, and public
interest." 158
This view of the Act's legislative history has been confirmed by
155. Verkuil, S11pra note 144, at 277.
156. Veto Message of the President, 86 CoNG. REc. 13,942-43. The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York said: "[W]e think the present bill, under the guise of reform, would
force administrative and departmental agencies having a wide variety of functions into a single
mold which is so rigid, so needlessly interfering, as to bring about a widespread crippling of
the administrative process." Report of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, quoted in
id at 13,943.
157. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, Sllpra note 143, at 256. See also S. REP. No. 752, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1945),
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Sllpra note 143, at 198.
The influence of the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure is again apparent With particular regard to the rulemaking process, the scheme
should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected to present their
views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of alternative
courses. They should also be adapted to eliciting, far more systematically and specifically
than a legislature can achieve, the information, facts, and probabilities which are necessary to fair and intelligent action.
FINAL REPORT, S11pra note 141, at 98. The choice of the manner and means necessary to
accumulate the information required to promulgate a fair rule is to be left to the sound discretion of the agencies themselves: "Here, as elsewhere in the administrative process, ultimate
reliance must be on administrative good faith." Id at 104.
158. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, S11pra note 143, at 259. See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1945),
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Sllpra note 143, at 200-01.
This general objective of maintaining individual agency integrity and flexibility in the informal rulemaking process reflected in the legislative history of the Act, and also in the general
provisions of§ 553, is most clearly established by the specific requirement of§ 553(e) that
agencies allow the public to request the initiation of a rulemaking proceeding: "Each agency
shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). The legislative history of the section and the case law interpreting it make it abundantly clear that the decision to act on such a petition is committed
solely to the agency being petitioned and its decision is final, though subject to limited judicial
review in certain circumstances. See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S11pra note 143, at 258 (Senate Report), 260 (House Report); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr 38-39 (1947). The Attorney General's Manual is normally accorded considerable deference because of the role the Attorney General played in drafting the legislation.
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
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the courts. The case law has consistently affirmed agencies' discretion to decide exactly how they will conduct their rulemaking activities. The Supreme Court, for example, has upheld an agency's
decision to promulgate rules through adjudication rather than informal rulemaking, 159 and the choice of informal rulemaking over a
formal hearing on the record when the agency's statute did not
clearly require the formal process. 160 And, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources .Defense Council, Inc. ,161 the
Court strongly endorsed an agency's unqualified discretion in informal rulemaking to adopt only the minimal procedures prescribed by
the APA. 162 Vermont Yankee is especially relevant here because the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, like President Reagan, had claimed that its competing constitutional duties authorized
the imposition of procedures beyond the statutory minimum. In particular, the D.C. Circuit relied on its constitutional obligation of judicial review to justify its action. In an opinion remarkable for its
reproving tone, the Court upheld the agency's discretion against the
countervailing interests of the judiciary. After reviewing the legislative history and the relevant judicial precedent, the Court declared:
"In short, all of this leaves little doubt that Congress intended that
the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be exercised
in determining when extra procedural devices should be employed." 163 Under this reading of the Act, the President, notwithstanding his constitutional obligations, should likewise be denied
authority to require additional procedures of an agency. His action,
no less than that of the D.C. Circuit in Vermont Yankee, constitutes
a "serious departure from the very basic tenet of administrative law
that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure." 164
Executive Order 12,291's interference with an agency's freedom
to fashion its own procedures is remarkable. A partial list of the
additional procedures required by the Order includes:
(1) preparation of a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to publica159. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290.95 (1974).
160. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
161. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
162. The Coun brought a halt to a trend of lower court decisions that sought to influence
the process of regulatory policy-making by judicially imposing procedural requirements on
informal rulemaking beyond those required by the APA. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Portland Cement Assn. v.
Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
163. 435 U.S. at 546 (emphasis in original).
164. 435 U.S. at 544.
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tion of proposed and final rules; 165
(2) consultation with the Director of the 0MB, at his request, concerning proposed rules;I66
(3) preparation of a legal memorandum determining that a final
rule is "clearly" within the agency's statutory authority; 167
(4) determining that an adopted final rule have substantial support
in the rulemaking record; 168
(5) initiation, at the request of the Director of the 0MB, of costbenefit review of an agency's existing regulations; 169 and
(6) delaying the effective date of an adopted fU:le until the Director
of the 0MB has responded to the Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying the final rule and the agency has responded to the Director's
comments. 170

These additional procedural steps, one might reasonably conclude,
are well-advised. Indeed, recent legislative proposals considered by
Congress have incorporated many of the Order's procedural features.171 However desirable, these procedures are inconsistent with
the APA, and as Congress has recognized, the Act must be amended
before such procedural requirements can become law.
Executive Order 12,291 stands in direct opposition to the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA and to the Act's legislative
history. 172 The Order effectively allows the Director of 0MB to determine when an agency must undertake rulemaking, contrary to
section 553(e); prescribes the procedures that an agency must follow
in its rulemaking; requires the use of the substantive principles of
cost-benefit analysis; and superimposes a central coordinating au165. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194-95 (1981).
166. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(l), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
167. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 4(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
168. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 4(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
169. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(i}, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
170. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
171. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
172. Nothing has occurred legislatively to the APA since 1946 that would support such
presidential action. Its basic structure is the same today as it was in 1946. The amendments to
the Act have, if anything, reinforced the original scheme. Thus the Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)) (amended 1967), imposed
an obligation on the agencies to grant public access to agency records unless specifically exempted from disclosure. In 1974, continuing criticism of the agencies for undue•secrecy led to
further amendments of§ 552 designed to tighten the exemptions and to penalize agency noncompliance with the Act. Freedom of Information Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561-64 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The coverage of the Act was
expanded to embrace the Executive Office of the President. Freedom of Information Act, § 3
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976)). Finally, the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976
added an open meetings requirement as well as a prohibition against ex parte contacts in
formal ex parte rulemaking. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552(b), 557(d) (1976)). These changes are consonant with the public participation and public disclosure themes evident in the original Act. They in no way support the substantial overhaul effected by Executive Order 12,291.
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thority over all agency rulemaking, despite Congress's rejection of
the general manager approach of the Brownlow Report, its rejection
of the Federal Office of Administrative Procedure, and its general
rejection of uniform procedures that reduce the flexibility that is the
hallmark of informal rulemaking. As the previous section demonstrated, Executive Order 12,291 must receive strong legislative support to survive Justice Jackson's separation of powers test. Because
the Order falls within Congress's exclusive domain, it can be upheld
only if Congress has implicitly delegated the President authority to
promulgate it.
_
Yet Congress has not delegated the President authority to promulgate the unprecedented regulatory oversight scheme established
by Executive Order 12,291. Instead of a delegation, one can, in fact,
discern an affirmative intent to deny the President authority to promulgate both the substantive and the procedural features of the Order. Thus, whether viewed as within Congress's exclusive domain or
within the nebulous zone of concurrent authority, Executive Order
12,291 violates the constitutional separation of powers.
II.

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND

Ex

PARTE CONTACTS

Executive Order 12,291 commands the early intervention of the
President's closest aides and advisers in the agency rulemaking process. In so doing, the Order greatly increases the opportunities for
off-the-record, ex parte contacts between executive agencies engaged
in rulemaking and the White House. Presidential advisers are likely
to use their oversight positions not only to comment on the agencies'
cost-benefit analyses, but also to convey informally their views about
the agencies' rulemaking activities. 173 Although such contacts arguably disrupt the kind of rulemaking proceedings contemplated by
the APA and undoubtedly raise serious questions of fairness, Executive Order 12,291 provides no safeguards whatsoever to protect the
integrity of the rulemaking process. Over the past few years, courts
and commentators have debated the extent to which ex parte contacts should be prohibited or controlled in informal rulemaking proceedings.174 A host of competin_g considerations have informed this
173. This aspect of the Order's oversight mechanism has already aroused concern. See
note 10 supra. To minimize the potential dangers associated with secret White House contacts,
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) has proposed that copies of all written and "significant" oral
comments from the 0MB to an agency regarding a proposed rule be included in the rulemaking file. See LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Oct. 5, 1981, at 5.
114. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,400 n.500 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing cases);
Carberry, Ex Parle Communications in Off-The-RecordAdministrative Proceedings: A Proposed
Limitation on Judicial Innovation, 1980 DUKE L.J. 65; Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agen-
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interesting debate. In 1976, Congress amended the APA to prohibit
ex parte contacts in formal, on-the-record rulemaking, but chose not
to extend the blanket prohibition to informal rulemaking. 175 Nevertheless, concerns for reasoned administrative decision-making, 176 efficacious judicial review, 177 fairness, 178 and meaningful public
participation 179 argue in favor of restricting ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking in certain circumstances. Vermont Yankee, however, seemingly calls for judicial restraint in the area. The issue
des: Ex Parle Contacts by the While House, 80 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 943 (1980); Note, .Due Process
and Ex Parle Contacts in Informal Rf!lemaking, 89 YALE L.J. 194 (1979).
175. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l) (1976). Ex parte contacts are defined by the APA as "oral or
written communication[s] not on the public record with respect to which reasonable public
notice to all parties is not given. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1976). The prohibition applies to
any "interested person outside the agency."
176. The courts have insisted that there be reasoned agency decision-making based on
some kind of record. Ex parte comments negate the opportunity for outside parties to comment on their substance. The lack of such adversarial discussion of the merits of the comments
is seen as weakening the agency's decision: "From a functional standpoint, we see no difference between assertions of facts and expert opinion tendered by the public, as here, and that
generated internally in an agency: each may be bi,ased, inaccurate, or incomplete - failings
which adversary comment may eliminate." Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
177.... As a practical matter, Overton Park's mandate means that the public record
must reflect what representations were made to an agency so that relevant information
supporting or refuting those representations may be brought to the attention of the reviewing courts by persons participating in agency proceedings. This course is obviously
foreclosed if the agency itself does not disclose the information presented. Moreover,
where, as here, an agency justifies its actions by reference only to information in the public file while failing to disclose the substance of other relevant information that has been
presented to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that the agency has acted properly,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415, 419-20; see K. Davis,
Administrative Law ef the Seventies § 11.00 at 317 (1976), but must treat the agency's
justifications as a fictional account of the actual decision-making process and must
perforce find its actions arbitrary. See Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F. Supp. 686, 690
(D.D.C. 1973), qffirmed by order, D.C. Cir. No. 73-1985 (Oct. 26, 1976).
567 F.2d at 54. See also Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
178. The Home Box Office court also recognized that secret communications wit!!_ agency
decision-makers are inconsistent "with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process
and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits.· ..." 567 F.2d at 56. See
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commn., 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
179. Agency decisions are to be made after a full public airing of all relevant issues and
factual disputes. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221,224 (D.C.
Cir. 1959). Public participation is a crucial aspect of this principle. But ex parte communications may nullify that participation. Due process, therefore, requires that such contacts be
restricted...to the greatest extent possible. Home Box Office v. FCC, .55/ F..2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
A similar conclusion was reached in United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime
Commn., 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Although the case in}'.olved an informal adjudication,
the court noted that the "quasi-adjudicatory" procedure.in_-question had to be protected
against ex parte communications because the impact of ·agep.im action would extend "well
beyond the immediate parties involved." 584 F.2d at 539. Thcfci>urt added that "however we
label the proceedings involved here and in our earlier cases, the common theme remains: that
ex parte communications and agency secrecy as to their substance and existence serve effectively to deprive the public of the right to participate meaningfully in the decisionmaking
process." 584 F.2d at 539.
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becomes even more complicated where, as here, the contacts occur
between executive agencies and the White House. While the President's article II duties and the concept of executive privilege sanctioned in United States v. Nixon 180 arguably should give the
President greater leeway to contact those agencies, his enormous influence over them increases the need for restraints.
Balancing these conflicting concerns, this Part proposes that certain judicially enforced limitations on ex parte contacts between
presidential advisers and executive agencies accompany Executive
Order 12,291. Where the rulemaking is of an adjudicatory nature,
due process dictates that the substance of the ex parte communications be publicly disclosed in the rulemaking docket. Even where
the rulemaking does not adjudicate individual rights, certain guidelines must be observed. White House contacts should be publicly
disclosed, for example, where the President or his advisers are acting
as a conduit for information received from interested private parties.
In cases where the President or his advisers simply convey the Administration's policy, however, a strong case can still be made for
disclosure of the existence, if not the substance, of such ex parte communications in the rulemaking docket. On a case-by-case basis,
courts should invalidate agency action where the White House fails
to conform to the guidelines outlined above.
A. Ex Parle Contacts in Informal Adjudications

The APA makes no provision for informal adjudications - adjudications unaccompanied by the protections of a formal, judicial
trial. To conserve their resources, many agencies therefore hold adjudicatory proceedings under the APA's informal rulemaking provisions. Since these informal adjudications involve individual rights
rather than issues of general policy, they implicate constitutional due
process values. 181 Although due process does not generally require a
full-scale judicial trial, informal adjudications must nevertheless
conform to the "fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due
process." 182
Ex parte contacts may undermine the due process rights of parties to informal adjudications in several important respects. By depriving the parties to the adjudication of notice and an opportunity
180. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
181. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Carberry, supra note 174, at 98-99; Verkuil, supra note 174, at 982.
182. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
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to respond to relevant information, ex parte contacts violate fundamental canons of fairness. 183 Moreover, the impartiality and objectivity of the decisi~n-maker, qualities traditionally regarded as
essential to due process, are compromised by ex parte contacts. 184
Such contacts, as one commentator has stated, create "a fertile bed
for arbitrary administrative action." 185
While the "poisonous" effects of ex parte contacts are pronounced in an adjudicatory setting, the reasons for judicial restraint
are attenuated. First, Vermont Yankee's message that courts should
be wary of imposing additional procedural requirements on informal
administrative rulemaking does not apply to adjudications implicating due process values. The Vermont Yankee Court explicitly qualified its holding, stating: "[W]hen an agency is making a 'quasijudicial' determination . . . in some circumstances additional procedures may be required in order to afford the aggrieved individuals
due process." 186 Second, the President's article II .duties are not impaired by restrictions on ex parte contacts between the White House
and executive agencies in informal adjudications. The President's
authority is necessarily circumscribed in an area more closely related
to the judicial than to the executive sphere. In the words of one
scholar: "There is no inherent executive power to control the rights
of individuals in an adjudicative setting." 187 Third, because the
President's article II powers are of dubious applicability in such a
setting, claims of executive privilege, a doctrine that analytically
should encompass only activities properly within the executive
power, are also of questionable validity. The due process interests
present in adjudicatory proceedings, moreover, should override the
limited concept of executive privilege established in United States v.
183. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that execution of a prejudgment
writ of replevin without hearing or notice to the affected party Yiolates due process).
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
"Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they
may enjoy that right they must first be notified." It is equally fundamental that the right
to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."
407 U.S. at 80 (citations omitted).
184. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (''Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but 'our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.' ") (citations omitted). See note 176 supra.
185. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 228 (1978).
186. 435 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted). "Where agency action resembles judicial action,
where it involves . . . quasi-adjudication among 'conflicting claims to a valuable private privilege,' the insulation of the decisionmaker from ex parte contacts is justified by basic notions of
due process to the parties involved.'' Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
187. Verkuil, supra note 174, at 982.
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Nixon. 188 In sum, because the President's authority is at a low ebb
and sensitive due process concerns are involved, informal adjudications present an especially strong case for restricting ex parte
contacts.
The line between an adjudication, where due process applies, and
a policy-type rulemaking, where due process does not apply, will
often be difficult to draw. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, attempted to shed some light on the distinction. In United
States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 189 for example, the Court distinguished between "proceeding[s] for the purpose of promulgating
policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings
designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases, on the
other." 190 More recently, the Vermont Yankee Court declared that
an agency conducts an adjudication when it makes "a 'quasi-judicial' determination by which a very small number of persons are 'exceptionally affected in each case upon individual grounds.' " 191 Yet
the distinction between policy-type and adjudicatory determinations
is often blurred; administrative proceedings often combine both adjudicatory and policy-making features. United States Lines, Inc. v.
Federal Maritime Commission, 192 one of the more recent ex parte
contacts cases, illustrates this point. In United States Lines, the Federal Maritime Commission was required to decide whether certain
named parties were entitled to an exemption from the antitrust laws.
So described, the Commission's proceedings satisfied the Vermont
Yankee definition of an adjudication, but the proceedings also required policy-making since the Commission was "charged with enforcing and guarding the public interest, with the impact of its
decision extending well beyond the immediate parties involved." 193
The frequent admixture of policy-making and adjudicatory elements in informal agency proceedings suggests the need for a flexible
solution to the problem of White House contacts. Rather than
prohibiting White House contacts, the most sensible solution would
require public disclosure of the substance of all such contacts in the
rulemaking docket whenever the proceeding has an adjudicatory
component. Because disclosure allows affected parties to respond to
relevant information and enables courts to determine whether
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
410 U.S. 224 (1973).
410 U.S. at 245.
435 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted).
584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
584 F.2d at 540.
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agency decisions are based on legitimate factors, this requirement
adequately protects the due process interests threatened by ex parte
contacts. By allowing ex parte contacts between the White House
and executive agencies to occur, the proposed requirement also defers to the President's legitimate desire to suggest general policies.
If the proceeding under review was adjudicatory, even in part,
therefore, courts should invalidate agency action where agency communications with White House officials charged with oversight responsibilities under Executive Order 12,291 have not been publicly
revealed.
B. Ex Parle Contacts in I'!formal Policy-Making Proceedings

A more vexing problem concerns the legitimacy of unrecorded
and unreviewable White House communications in policy-type informal rulemakings. When the proceedings involve no adjudicatory
component, the argument for disclosure of these communications
cannot be bolstered by reference to the need to preserve due process.
One must recognize, moreover, that article II of the Constitution authorizes the President to supervise and coordinate policy-making
pr9ceedings, at least by using facilitative measures and making policy suggestions. And Vermont Yankee's instruction that courts
should not fashion additional procedures to further "some vague,
undefined public good" 194 suggests that a disclosure requirement
must find a solid statutory basis.
The APA furnishes two possible bases for a requirement that ex
parte contacts be publicly disclosed. First, secret ex parte contacts
arguably undermine section 553's provision for "notice and comment" participation by interested parties. 195 Second, section 706's
provision for judicial review under an arbitrary and capricious standard can be read to require that significant contacts be included in
the record available to a reviewing court. 196 Although these arguments are plausible, courts have declined to adopt a general disclosure requirement in informal rulemakings under the APA. 197
Retreating from broad language in an earlier case, the D.C. Circuit
held inAction For Children's Television v. FCC 198 that the APA does
194. 435 U.S. at 549.
195. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1976).
196. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). Section 706, which apparently applies to all of the Act's scopeof-review provisions, provides in part: "In making the foregoing determinations, the court
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error."
197. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
198. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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not warrant a logging requirement that applies generally in informal
rulemaking proceedings.
Although the Children's Television court's conclusion appears
sound, it does not address the more specific situation where ex parte
communications are cloaked with the authority of the presidential
office. The President's personal and institutional power will undoubtedly lead agencies to attribute more weight to communications
emanating from his office than to communications originating with
private parties. Isolated off-the-record contacts between agencies
and private parties, the sort of contact that Congress probably did
not intend generally to preclude, are unlikely to affect the decisionmaking process significantly. But the regular ex parte communications initiated by the White House under Executive Order 12,291
might undercut the APA's provision for public participation. Surely,
Congress did not expect that interested parties would be unaware of
information or arguments that will figure so prominently in the
agencies' decisions. Yet if influential White House contacts are permitted to occur in secrecy, interested parties will have little incentive
to prepare the information and arguments that agencies have found
so valuable in the past. Public participation would indeed be reduced to a "sham." 199
In addition to diminishing the value of public participation, secret White House communications impair the quality of judicial review. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 200 the
Supreme Court held that the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review requires courts to conduct a "searching and careful"
inquiry based on "the full administrative record that was before the
[agency official] at the time he made his decision." 201 Secret, unreported communications that nevertheless play a vital role in the
agency's decision prevent courts from performing effectively the
searching review contemplated by Overton Park. 202
Despite the heightened need to control White House communications, the D.C. Circuit recently refused to require the disclosure of ex
parte presidential communications. In Sierra Club v. Costle,203 President Carter had met with officials of the EPA to discuss proposed
rules after the close of the notice and comment period. The court
199. United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Commn., 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
200. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
201. 401 U.S. at 416, 420.
202. See United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Commn., 584 F.2d 519, 541-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
203. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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held that the agency's failure to docket the meeting in its rulemaking
record did not violate the Clean Air Act. Although the Act requires
that all documents ''which the Administrator determines to be of
central relevance to the rulemaking" be placed in the record,204 the
Sierra Club court stated that nondisclosure was legal "since EPA
makes no effort to base the rule on any 'data or information' arising
from [the presidential contact]."205 The court's conclusion that judicial review does not demand "that courts know the details of every
White House contact, including a Presidential one, in this informal
rulemaking setting"206 however, may be limited to the facts of the
case. Judicial review in Sierra Club was made possible by specific
provisions of the Clean Air Act, which require that rules find the
requisite factual support in the record and prohibit rules based in
whole or in part on any "data or information" not in the record.207
Had the particular statute in issue not contained these review-facilitating provisions, the court might well have reached a different
conclusion.
When one compares the Clean Air Act and Executive Order
12,291, it becomes apparent that the rationale underlying the legal
acceptability of the undisclosed presidential contacts in Sierra Club
ddes not legitimize all presidential contacts under the Order. Most
executive agencies are not subject to justificatory requirements as
stringent as those of the Clean Air Act. Since the APA does not
explicitly require that these agencies rely only on docketed information, they must satisfy only the disclosure requirements implicit in
Overton Park. Although Executive Order 12,291, unlike the APA,
demands that agency decisions receive substantial factual support in
the record, it does not require that agency decisions be based entirely
on recorded information.208 This comparatively weak limitation on
presidential influence, combined with the regularity with which
White Hou~e ·contacts will probably occur under the Order,209 mean
204. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1978).
205. 657 F.2d at 407.
206. 657 F.2d at 407.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(C) (Supp. II 1978).
208. Exec. Order 12,291 § 4(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981).
209. See generally Verkuil, supra note 174, at 950-51. Indeed, these contacts may be encouraged by the 0MB:
0MB staff possess far less e~rtise than agency staff on specialized regulatory issues, and
in the short time available will not be able to read, let alone understand, the voluminous
rulemaking records. Instead, pMB is likely to view the issues from a political or ideological perspective, relying on the arguments of White House political advisors or special
interest lobbyists. The tendency will be particularly pronounced when major political
supporters of the White House incumbent become interested in a proceeding.
C. LUDLAM, supra note I, at 18.
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that the need for disclosure of these contacts is greater than in Sierra
Club.
The reasoning of the Sierra Club court, moreover, is vulnerable
to criticism. In holding that the substance of the presidential contact
need not be divulged, the court relied heavily on the President's article II authority to monitor and contribute to administrative policymaking. This consideration certainly favors allowing presidential
contacts to occur, but its relevance as an argument against disclosure
of those contacts rests on an unstated assumption: namely, that disclosure will adversely affect the President's policy-making authority.
This assumption is arguably supported by the President's presumptive privilege of confidentiality. In United States v. Nixon, 210 the
Supreme Court declared that "[a] President and those who assist him
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."211
It is doubtful, however, that the President's privilege of confidentiality properly applies in the Sierra Club situation. Nixon dealt with
communications between the President and his closest advisers. In
Sierra Club, by way of contrast, the President's communications
were directed at an executive agency in the exercise of essentially
legislative responsibilities - an area where, as Part I argued, the
President's authority must be carefully delimited. A disclosure requirement might well hinder presidential efforts to (?Ontrol administrative policy-making. But, so long as the President remains free to
thrash out alternatives secretly with his closest advisers, it is doubtful
that disclosure would greatly impede his ability to recommend policies to executive agencies. The Nixon Court, moreover, held that a
demonstrable need for disclosure may overcome the limited privilege of confidentiality.212 Here the publicity that the Constitution
demands of the legislative process, the public participation in
rulemaking contemplated by the APA, and the Act's provision for
judicial review all point to the desirability of disclosure. United
States v. Nixon thus fails to support the Sierra Club court's assumption that the President's article II powers impliedly protect the confidentiality of ex parte presidential communications.
Accordingly, courts should require that the substance of ex parte
210. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
211. 418 U.S. at 708. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 32S
(D.D.C. 1966).
212. 418 U.S. at 713.
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communications between White House and agency officials be disclosed in the rulemaking docket.
Even if courts accept Sierra Club's expansive view of presidential
authority and refuse to adopt the generalized disclosure requirement
stated above, one can still defend a disclosure requirement limited to
conduit contacts, through which the President relays the views of private parties to agency officials. Nongovernmental interests, recognizing that Executive Order 12,291 creates a new point of access to
the decision-making process, may attempt to utilize the White House
or the 0MB as a conduit for their views, thereby covertly influencing
agency rulemaking. In such instances there is usually no public
knowledge of the contact or of what was communicated. 213 Commentators have been especially troubled by the prospect of the President, in effect, lobbying on behalf of private parties.214 Professor
Verkuil, for example, has expressed concern for the integrity of the
governmental process
when White House actions reflect the interests of private industry in
emphasizing a cost-minimization regulatory policy. Powerful private
lobbies, increasingly frustrated in obtaining preferential access to administrators, can be expected to use White House political advisors to
achieve equivalent clout. The expressed fear is that government regulation will be co-opted by private groups through the intercession of
the White House. 215

Because private parties can always communicate directly with an
agency, the White House serves only to magnify the influence of interested private parties who seek a particular result in rulemaking
proceedings.216 It is not difficult to conclude that Congress did not
213. The Freedom of Information Act is ofno aid in such situations since the communications are usually oral and thus not discoverable. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
214. See Bruff, supra note 26, at 466,504; John & Litan, Sierra Club v. Costle-Regulatory Oversight Wins in Court, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1981, at 17, 23-24; Verkuil, supra note
174, at 981.
215. Verkuil, supra note 174, at 950-51.
216. Direct ex-parte approaches by lobbyists to agency officials are serious enough but
0MB dealings with these lobbyists raise other troubling possibilities. If persons interested
in a proceeding have ex-parte communications with 0MB, rather than with the agency,
and 0MB then communicates those views to the agency without identifying the source of
its information, the views will be invested with OMB's authority, rather than seen as
merely another partisan argument by a special interest participant. In this example, 0MB
serves as an influential back-door "conduit" for communicating the views ofpnvate parties to the agency.
'
C. LUDLAM, supra note I, at 40.
Ludlam continues:
The intent of the White House to use the regulatory process to assist political allies
seems clear. In an April 10, 1981, speech before the Chamber of Commerce, Boyden
Gray, the Vice President's Counsel and Counsel to the Task Force on Regulatory Relief,
invited the audience to bring their regulatory problems to the White House. He said,
If you go the agency first, don't be too pessimistic if they can't solve the problem there.
If they don't, that's what the Task Force is for.
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intend the informality of the APA's rulemaking provisions to legitimize behind-the-scenes favoritism.
The Sierra Club court recognized, but did not resolve, the conduit contacts problem. Noting that the Carter Justice Department
had recommended that all conduit contacts be placed in the
rulemaking record, 217 the court found "no reason to believe that a
policy similar to this was not followed here, or that unrecorded conduit communications exist in this case."218 Accordingly, the court
refused to authorize further discovery on the issue.
There are strong reasons to believe that Executive Order 12,291
will create a conduit contact problem far more serious than that perceived by the Sierra Club court. In funneling all agency rules
through one coordinating agency, the 0MB, the Order makes available to interested private parties a new access point to the decisionmaking process. In addition, the Order provides only minimal safeguards against improper favoritism. In contrast to guidelines developed under the Carter Administration, the OMB's current position is
that not all oral and written communications with private parties
need to be summarized and disclosed in the rulemaking record. A
recent memorandum simply advises officials involved in the Order's
oversight program to advise private parties submitting "factual
materials" to refer such matters to the responsible agency. 219 The
oral statements, policy views, and legal arguments of private parties
apparently escape the memorandum's relatively weak referral requirement. Thus, the oversight mechanism established by Executive
Order 12,291 is rife with the potential for abuse.
A requirement that all White House communications with agencies regarding a proposed rule during the pendency of rulemaking
proceedings be accompanied by disclosure of relevant communications from interested private parties received by the President or his
advisers while those proceedings were pending would place a needed
Id. at 50.
217. See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for Hon. Cecil D.
Andrus, ·secretary of Interior, Re: Consultation With Council of Economic Advisers Concerning Rulemaking Under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (undated), reprinted in
LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Jan. 29, 1979, at 32-33.
218. 657 F.2d at 405 n.520.
219. Certain Communications Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,291, "Federal Regulation" (memorandum from David A. Stockman, Director, 0MB, to heads of executive departments and agencies, June 11, 1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). See LEOAL
TIMES OF WASH., June 22, 1981, at 1, 11. The memo, issued by 0MB, "does not require 0MB
to log contacts with outsiders on regulatory issues or notify concerned agencies of such contacts." Id. at 1. One observer points out that "factual materials" "does not appear to cover
oral communications, which are the primary means of communications at OMB." Id. at 11.
Submissions of policy or legal analysis may also escape coverage under the 0MB memo. Id.
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check on this potential for abuse. This requirement emphasizes that
the relevant agency, not the White House, was meant to be the primary forum for communication of technical data, policy views, and
legal arguments. By making agencies aware of the source of information and arguments presented by the President and his advisers in
rulemaking proceedings, the requirement should ensure that no undue weight is given to the views of interested parties with allies in the
White House.
Although one may consider overly broad a general disclosure requirement applicable to White House policy communications, obvious problems would arise in applying a more limited conduit
communication disclosure rule. The difficulty lies in distinguishing
between policy positions of private parties and those of the White
House: The President and his advisers might adopt as their own the
views privately urged by interested parties. Despite this ostensible
classificatory dilemma, it is undesirable to limit a conduit contact
disclosure rule to material factual information.22 First, the possibility that the White House will lend its credibility to a private position
due to mere favoritism exists with regard to policy and legal arguments as well as to factual information. Second, interested parties
must rebut and reviewing courts must scrutinize not only the factual
data presented in rulemaking proceedings, but also the policy and
legal arguments that an agency has considered. Finally, a rule requiring that White House comments on proposed rules be accompanied by disclosure of private communications received by the
President and his advisers during the pendency of the rulemaking
proceedings will not unduly constrain expressions of White House
policy to agency decision-makers: Presidential aides remain free
both to communicate their own views and to endorse the views of
private parties.
Ex parte contacts give rise to concerns that vary somewhat according to the nature of the rulemaking - whether adjudicatory or
policy-making - and the type of communication - whether direct
from the White House or a so-called conduit contact. One can make
a virtually unassailable argument for a disclosure requirement in ad-

°

220. Co=entators have argued that ex parte contacts that co=unicate significant new
information should be logged on a public record. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE§ 6:18 (2d ed. 1978). Apparently realizing the difficulty or arbitrariness in distinguishing between information and argument, the Administrative Law Conference has recommended that agencies "experiment in appropriate situations with procedures designed to
disclose oral co=unications from outside the agency of significant information or argument
respecting the merits of proposed rules." l C.F.R. § 205.77-3 (1980) (Admin. Conf. of the
United States, Ex Parte Co=UD,ications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, Rec. No. 77-3)
(emphasis added).
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judicatory rulemaking proceedings. As both Vermont Yankee and
Sierra Club recognize, courts may justifiably intervene to protect the
due process rights of affected individuals. But the overwhelming
strength of the argument in an adjudicatory setting should not lead
one to conclude that a disclosure requirement is not warranted in
other settings as well. Although competing considerations based on
the President's article II powers and responsibilities come to the fore
in policy-type rulemakings, an undeniable need for disclosure remains. That need is perhaps greatest in the conduit contact situation, where the danger of arbitrary decision-making is especially
pronounced.
CONCLUSION

Executive Order 12,291 exceeds the proper bounds of presidential authority. By imposing a substantive cost-benefit requirement,
the Order displaces the discretion of agency officials to formulate
domestic policy. It thus significantly interferes with a function over
which the Constitution gives Congress primary, if not exclusive control. Althoqgh the President is authorized to coordinate and supervise the executive branch, he has no inherent authority to control
executive agencies executing essentially legislative duties delegated
to the agencies by Congress. And Congress's evident desire to deny
the President formalized control over administrative policy-making
effectively refutes the claim that the President has concurrent authority in the area. The President's authority to force executive agencies
to use procedures in addition to those mandated by the APA in informal rulemaking is similarly attenuated. The rather extensive array of procedures that the Order requires impinges on the
informality and flexibility that the APA contemplates.
A complete discussion of Executive Order 12,291's legitimacy
must mention the serious problem of secret ex parte contacts raised
by the Order. It is reasonable to expect that informal and undisclosed messages will regularly fl.ow in the more formal chamiel of
communication between the 0MB and executive agencies that the
Order establishes. The 0MB oversight mechanism, moreover, creates a new and influential entry point to the rulemaking process that
private parties with allies in the White House will seek to exploit.
The dilemma posed by unrecorded ex parte contacts is especially
acute where, as here, the communications occur between White
House and agency officials - these communications become
weighted with the prestige and authority of the presidential office.
To ensure fidelity to due process and the integrity of informal
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rulemaking as envisaged by Congress, courts should require that significant White House contacts be disclosed in the rulemaking docket.
During the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate Reagan promised to unshackle the free enterprise system and "to relieve the small
business man of the burdens of excessive regulation."221 The bloated
pledges characteristic of modem presidential campaigns help perpetuate the image of a President possessing virtually unbounded authority. The reality, of course, is that the President's unilateral
authority to implement his domestic policies is subject to powerful
constitutional and statutory co~traints.

221. N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1980, § B, at 4, col. 6.

